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Abstract
Limited Lookahead Policies for Robust Supervisory Control of Discrete
Event Systems
Farzam Boroomand
In this thesis, Limited Lookahead Policies (LLP) have been developed for Robust Non-
blocking Supervisory Control Problem (RNSCP) of discrete event systems. In the robust
control problem considered here, the plant model is assumed to belong to a given finite set
of DES models.
The introduced supervisor computes the control action in online fashion and it is named
Robust Limited Lookahead (RLL) supervisor. In comparison with offline supervisory con-
trol, RLL supervisor can reduce the complexity associated with the computation of control
law as it looks at the behavior of system at the current state and of a limited depth in future.
Since a conservative policy is adopted here, the behavior of the system under supervi-
sion of the RLL supervisor is generally more restrictive than the optimal offline supervisor.
A sufficient condition is presented under which a limited lookahead window can guarantee
the optimality (maximal permissiveness) of the RLL supervisor.
In some problems, the required window length for maximally permissive RLL supervi-
sor may become unbounded. To overcome this limitation RNSCP with State information
(RNSCP-S) is studied and solved resulting in a state-based RLL (RLL-S) supervisor.
The results of this thesis can be regarded as an extension of previous work in the lit-
erature on limited lookahead policies for (non-robust) supervisory control to the case of
nonblocking robust supervisory control.
The robust limited lookahead design procedures are implemented in MATLAB envi-
ronment and applied to two examples involving spacecraft propulsion systems.
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This thesis studies robust nonblocking supervisor control problem of discrete event systems
where the exact model of the system is unknown but it belongs to a finite set of possible
models. The solution to the robust nonblocking control problem in literature is computed
off-line before the system starts execution. Finding the off-line supervisory control map
can be computationally infeasible due to the size of the system. Even storing the resulting
supervisor may not be possible because of limited available computer memory. Further,
the complete description of the system might be unavailable in the design stage in the case
of time-varying systems. To tackle these issues, we present an online solution for robust
nonblocking supervisory control problem based on limited lookahead policy. The online
supervisor computes the control action for the current state based on some knowledge of
the future behavior of the plant.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first introduce conventional (non-robust) supervi-
sory control problem in Section 1.1. In Section 1.2 robust supervisory control with model
uncertainty is introduced. Section 1.3 introduces online supervisory control with lookahead
policies. After a literature review on robust supervisory control and lookahead policies in
Section 1.4, the objectives and contributions of this thesis are presented in Section 1.5. The
organization of this thesis is finally presented in Section 1.6.
1
1.1 Supervisory Control of Discrete Event Systems
Discrete-event systems (DES) constitute a class of systems with a discrete state-space
whose dynamics can be characterized by sequences of discrete events. A transition within
the state-space of a DES happens upon the occurrence of a discrete event.
Example 1.1. As an example of DES consider pressure isolation assembly of a simplified
version of the Cassini Main Propulsion System (CMPS) [1] presented in Figure 1.1. The
system consists of four pyro-valves (PVi, i = 1, ...,4), two regular valves (V1, V2) and
two pressure sensors. The valves have two states which are open or closed. The pressure
sensors measure the pressure in the upstream of each engine which can be either low or









Figure 1.1: Simplified CMPS.
In general, some behaviors of the systemmay be undesirable. In the preceding example,
we would like to avoid the states where both engines are fired simultaneously. We must
2
assure that there exists a fuel path between the tank and only one of the engines at each
time. The goal of supervisory control is to determine how the behavior of a system should
be altered in order to achieve the desired behavior and avoid the undesirable behavior. This
can be achieved through the Ramadge-Wonham supervisory control framework presented
in [2], [3], [4].
In this framework, a supervisor positioned in a feedback loop as shown in Figure 1.2,
alters the behavior of the plant by disabling or enabling controllable events so that the
behavior of system is restricted to the desirable behavior. The supervisor also prevents
the system from being blocked. In Example 1.1 opening and closing of the valves are
controllable events. The changes in pressure sensor readings are uncontrollable as they are






Figure 1.2: Supervisory control framework.
In many practical cases, the supervisor can be regarded as a finite-state automaton. Each
state of this automaton corresponds to a unique control action. Specifically, the presence
of an event in a state indicates that the event is enabled. If an event is absent in a state of
the supervisor automaton, then it means that the event will be disabled by the supervisor
(should the plant attempt to execute the event). The control action can also be based on
3
the plant states (instead of executed event sequences). In this case, the supervisor is a state
feedback law (a map from plant state to control action).
1.2 Robust Supervisory Control
Conventional supervisory control assumes that the system model is known and it is certain
at the design stage. This assumption is not always true, the system model may change
during the operation due to different reasons (e.g. failure in a component). Also, the design
objectives may vary over the course of operation. Robust control is developed in order to
deal with this uncertainty in the systems. Robust control approaches have been studied in
both continuous and discrete systems.
For discrete event systems different approaches exist to study modeling uncertainty. In
this thesis, we assume that the exact model of the DES is unknown but it belongs to a finite
set of possible models. The specification for each of the possible models might be different
from the others. The goal is to design a robust supervisor which works properly for all
plant models. This means that the plants should remain nonblocking under supervision,
while their behavior remain within the legal limits. The main problem of this thesis is to
design a maximally permissive online supervisor which ensures safety and nonblocking
requirements of all the possible models.
Two problems that can be regarded as special cases of the robust control problem are
fault recovery [22] and supervisory control with multiple marked state sets [5]. In fault
recovery problem, the true model of a system can be either the normal model or any of the
normal-failure models. In case of a component failure, a robust supervisor should guarantee
that the system fulfills safety requirement while remaining nonblocking.
Consider the propulsion system in Example 1.1. Assume that each of the regular valves
V1 or V2 has a failure mode, stuck-closed. Before the system starts operation, we do not
know if any of the failures will happen or not. Considering a single failure scenario, we
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will have three different possible models of the system. A normal model, where there is
no failure in the system, and two normal-failure models, where either V1 or V2 fails and
become stuck-closed.
In addition to uncertainty in components’ models, the mission goals might be different
before and after a failure. By mission goal, we mean the states in a system which corre-
sponds to completion of a task. In our example, the goal before a failure is: to fire one of
the engines and possibly switch from one engine to another. The objective after a failure
is usually less strict. In this example, we want to make sure that we can always generate
thrust in case of a single failure. This multi-objective problem, which is robust supervisory
control with multiple marking, can be formulated as a special case of robust problem.
1.3 Lookahead Policies for Supervisory Control
In off-line supervisory control, the control action (off-line supervisor) for all possible plant
behavior is computed at the design stage before the plant starts operation. This off-line
computation is a one-time investment, which guarantees satisfaction of the design speci-
fication. However, when the size of the plant state space becomes very large, it might be
impossible to accommodate this enormous computation. In addition, the size of an off-line
supervisor may become too large to be stored in computer memory. Consider a propulsion
system with thousands of failure models. Storing an off-line supervisor for such a system
requires memory which may not be available. On the other hand, in online computation of
the control action there is no need for storing a design.
In light of the above mentioned considerations, [7] presented supervisory control with
Limited Lookahead Policy (LLP) as an alternative to off-line computation.
In LLP supervisory control, the control action is computed online after execution of
each event. This computation is based on an N-step prediction of the future behavior of
the system. Assuming that an event sequence “s” has been generated, the control action
5
Ns
(a) All possible behavior after s up to N steps
N
s
(b) All legal behavior after s up to N steps
Figure 1.3: Tree expansion in the LLP scheme.
following “s” will be a list of enabled events. This procedure must be repeated after the
execution of every event. This means that the off-line design problem (which may be
computationally expensive) is replaced with repetitive computation of some similar but
smaller problems.
In LLP scheme, the set of event sequences (language) that the system can generate in
the nextN-steps is initially generated (Fig. 1.3 (a)). Next, a subset of this set which includes
legal sequences according to a specification is constructed. The two sets (languages) are
finite and are represented by their tree generators. The latter language is represented by a
sub-tree of the former one (Fig. 1.3 (b)). These trees change dynamically from step to step
and must be updated after the execution of every event.
The control action is then computed by finding supremal controllable sublanguage of
the predicted legal behavior with respect to the predicted closed behavior. The control loop












Figure 1.4: Supervisory Control with Lookahead Policies.
In the LLP framework, the behavior of the system beyond a trace (event sequence) with
the length of “N” is completely unknown. These traces are called pending traces. Two
different policies can be adopted toward pending traces. A pending trace may lead to an
illegal string by executing a set of uncontrollable events. To avoid the risk, we may adopt a
conservative policy toward the pending traces which treats all pending traces to be illegal.
In this sense, conservative policy assumes the worst situation and thus a conservative su-
pervisor is more restrictive than an optimal off-line supervisor. On the other hand, we may
assume that all the pending traces lead to a legal marked string which is an optimistic atti-
tude. In this situation, the system is given maximum freedom to proceed. However, some
of the pending traces may not lead to a legal marked state through a controllable path. This
means that an optimistic supervisor is more permissive than an optimal off-line supervisor.
Variable Lookahead Policies (VLP) are later presented as a modification of LLP in
order to compute the control action more efficiently. In this scheme, the tree expansion
ends whenever the control decision can be made unambiguously or whenever the boundary
7
of N-level tree is reached, whichever comes first [8].
In this thesis, we extend LLP with conservative policy to solve the robust nonblocking
supervisory control problem. We also obtain a set of sufficient conditions for optimality of
the robust LLP supervisor.
1.4 Literature Review
1.4.1 Robust Control
Robust supervisory control of DES was first studied by Lin in [12]. In the proposed frame-
work the author assumes that the exact model of the DES is unknown while it belongs to a
finite set of possible models G = {G1, ...,Gn}. It also assumes a common specification, K,
which is a sublanguage of marked behaviors of the possible models (K ⊆ ⋂
i
Lm(Gi)). The
goal within the framework is to find a supervisor which works with all the possible DES
models.
Takai [18] relaxes the constraint K ⊆ ⋂
i
Lm(Gi) in [12]; however, it only studies the
case of prefix-closed specifications. Thus, it does not consider the nonblocking property.
Later Takai [14], generalized the framework presented by [12] to the case of timed DES.
Park-Lim [19], [20] generalizes the framework presented by [12] to work with nondeter-
ministic DES.
In another attempt, [21] generalizes the framework of [12] by considering non-prefix
closed specifications that are not necessarily the same for all the models. The nonblocking
property of the models is ensured by a sufficient condition referred to as nonconflicting
property. Later [23] extended the results of [21] by (i) replacing nonconflicting property
with G-nonblocking property (which results in a necessary and sufficient condition set the
solution) and (ii) considering control under partial observation.
8
The authors in [28], extend robust supervisory control in [21] to the hierarchical frame-
work presented by [32].
In another framework of robust supervisory control, Curry-Krogh [29] and Takai [15],
[17] model the uncertainty in modeling using ω-languages. Having a supervisor which
works for a nominal plant, the framework aims to maximize the (infinite) set of plants for
which the supervisor is suitable.
In this thesis we are interested in the problem of robust nonblocking supervisory control
studied in [21] and [23]. We modify conventional LLP supervisor to solve the Robust
Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem (RNSCP) in an online fashion.
The presented approach is referred to as Robust Limited Lookahead (RLL) Supervisor.
It considers the behavior of the possible DES models by finding tree-expansions N-step
beyond the currently executed trace.
1.4.2 Lookahead Policies
Limited Lookahead Policy
In conventional (non-robust) DES framework of Ramadge-Wonham the supervisors are
computed entirely before the system begins operation (off-line design). Limited lookahead
supervision is referred to as online control because the control action is computed after
the occurrence of each event, while the system is operational. Limited Lookahead Policies
(LLP) are proposed in [7] to address the following difficulties of traditional supervisory
control:
• Finding off-line supervisor could be computationally infeasible due to the complexity
of DES or its legal behavior;
• Complete description of the DES or its legal behavior might be unavailable due to
time-varying property of the system.
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In view of these observations, [7] proposed LLP supervisor for online supervisory con-
trol of DES, where control action is computed based on N-step truncation of DES and its
legal behavior. The estimation of the plant model is in form of a tree-expansion. A tree-
expansion distinguishes between states based on their event histories. Once the plant and
its specification are estimated, the rest is very similar to off-line supervisory control. In
order to compute the control action, [7] has taken two different attitudes toward traces of
the length N in truncated model of DES (which are called pending traces): 1- conservative,
and 2- optimistic. The conservative policy assumes the worst case, where all pending traces
lead to an illegal string with execution of a set of uncontrollable events. Generally speaking,
the LLP supervisor with conservative attitude is less permissive compared with the off-line
supervisor. On the other hand the optimistic policy assumes that every pending trace lead to
a legal marked state through a controllable path. Thus, the LLP supervisor with optimistic
attitude is more permissive compared with the optimal supervisor. In summary, with an
insufficient length of lookahead window the LLP supervisor can be overly-accepting with
optimistic policy or overly-restrictive following the conservative policy.
The main challenge in the scheme of LLP supervisory control is to determine the min-
imum required length of lookahead window which guarantees optimality of the online su-
pervision. [7] presented a set of sufficient conditions under which the LLP supervisor
performs as well as optimal supervisor with complete information about the plant and its
specification.
Variable Lookahead Policy
The authors of [7] later observed that length of lookahead window can be modified for
some of the strings. Thus, in [8] they proposed a method for efficient calculation of online
supervisory control decision. Like LLP supervisor, the new approach works based on N-
step tree-expansion of the systems behavior, while tree expansion terminates whenever
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the control action can be made unambiguously or whenever the boundary of the N-step
projection reaches. This new approach is called Variable Lookahead Policy (VLP). VLP is
an efficient way of implementation for LLP.
Both LLP and VLP supervisors take linguistic approach for online computation of con-
trol action. This causes the required window size for the optimal supervisor to be infinite in
some cases. [9] presented a variable lookahead policy with state information named VLP-
S. The window size required for optimal VLP-S is always bounded for finite state plants.
VLP-S requires the specification to be a sub-automaton of the plant. If this is not the case,
[9] provides an approach for modifying the automata appropriately. Finally, [6] presents a
VLP for robust supervisory control of DES.
Other works in the area of online supervisory control of DES are as follows. Extension-
based Limited Lookahead (ELL) Policy is presented [10], [11]. The ELL supervisor avoids
the notion of pending traces by extending the behavior of the plant with any arbitrary behav-
ior beyond the N-step lookahead window. [13] presents an estimate-based Limited Looka-
head Policy which studies a special case where the specification is a closed language. [24]
generalizes the LLP framework to work with probabilistic DES. [25] studies the methods
for estimation of the size of state-space for lookahead tree-expansions.
In this thesis we study the robust nonblocking supervisory control with a conservative
limited lookahead policy. We also study the problem using state information in order to
guarantee the optimality of the Robust Limited Lookahead (RLL) supervisor.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
We can summarize the major contributions of this thesis as follows:
• We generalize the conservative limited lookahead policy presented in [7] to the case
of robust nonblocking control. We call the new supervisor Robust Limited Lookahead
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(RLL). We show the monotonicity property of the RLL supervisor in terms of the
length of the lookahead window. We determine the closed-form expression of the
language generated by the DES under supervision of the RLL supervisor. We also
present the lower bound of N which guarantees the optimal performance of the RLL
supervisor (under certain conditions).
• We study the case where the required length of window size for optimality becomes
infinite. To deal with this situation, we extend the linguistic approach of the RLL
supervisor to the case of supervisory control with state information. We refer to the
new supervisor as RLL-S. We present algorithms for online computation of RLL-S
based control actions.
• Furthermore, the procedures required for our lookahead policies are implemented in
MATLAB environment using the toolbox Discrete Event Control Kit (DECK) [44].
• We apply our proposed method to two different problems in propulsion systems of
Viking and Cassini spacecrafts. We study the effectiveness of the approach in each
of the two cases.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the supervisory
control of DES, as well as robust supervisory control, and LLP supervision. Chapter 3
formulates the problem studied in the thesis and provides the solution to online robust non-
blocking supervisory control with limited lookahead policy. It also discusses the properties
of the RLL supervisor. Chapter 4 transforms the RNSCP to a state-based problem and then
solves the online problem with state information. Chapter 5 discusses two application ex-
amples of the proposed method. The thesis is concluded at the end with a discussion and
presenting possible future research.
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1.7 Summary
This chapter provides an introduction to this thesis by introducing and motivating the Ro-
bust Limited Lookahead (RLL) supervision problem. The relevant literature has been re-




This chapter contains two parts. The first part presents a quick review on formal languages,
conventional and robust supervisory control, and online supervisory control scheme. The
second part presents preliminaries on the properties of post languages and other results
which are used to prove main results of this thesis. This chapter is mainly based on [42],
[41].
2.1 Discrete Event Models
A DES is formally defined as a dynamic system with a discrete state space, performing
asynchronous event driven transitions within the state-space. Discrete event systems are
typically employed to model man-made system which are governed by man-made rules
rather than physical laws. Examples of this type of systems are manufacturing systems,
telecommunication protocols and database systems. Different models are proposed in lit-
erature to model a DES each of which focuses on a different aspect of a DES. For example,
finite-state automaton takes a logical deterministic approach while Markov chain models




The transitions of a DES in state-space follows the occurrences of discrete events. We
assume that each event happens abruptly and that only one event happens at a time. Let Σ
be the event set of a DES also called an alphabet. A sequence of events over the alphabet
Σ is called a string or a trace. The empty string, denoted by , is defined as a string with no
event. A set of strings over an alphabet Σ is called a language. The language that includes
all the strings except  is defined as:
Σ+ = {α1...αn∣n > 0, αi ∈ Σ}
Then define:
Σ⋆ = Σ+ ∪ {}
2.1.2 Operations on Languages
Basic set operations are defined for languages as the language are sets of strings. Such basic
operations on two languages L1 and L2 are intersection L1∩L2, union L1∪L2, complement
Lco
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and negation L1−L2. Some other operations on languages are defined in the following:
Definition 2.1. Prefix-closure: Let L ⊆ Σ∗, then L ∶= {s ∈ Σ∗∣∃t ∈ Σ∗, st ∈ L}.
The string s is then called to be a prefix of t and it is denoted by s ≤ t. If s is a prefix of
t and s ≠ t then we denote it with s < t.
Definition 2.2. Post-language of a language L ⊆ Σ∗ after trace s ⊆ Σ∗ is defined as:
L/s ∶= {t ∈ Σ∗ ∣ st ∈ L}
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Definition 2.3. Quotient of L byM with L,M ⊆ Σ∗ is defined as:
L/M ∶= {w ∈ Σ∗ ∣ (∃x ∈M)wx ∈ L}
For a sequence s, let ∣s∣ denotes the length of s, i.e., the number of events in s when
s ≠  and ∣s∣ = 0 when s = .
Definition 2.4. Truncation of L to a non-negative integer N is defined as:
L∣N ∶= {t ∈ L ∣ ∣t∣ ≤ N}
Some useful properties of the post-language operation which are employed in this thesis
are presented in Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Let K1,K2 ⊆ Σ∗ and s ∈ Σ∗. Then:
1) (K1 ∩K2)/s =K1/s ∩K2/s
(K1 ∪K2)/s =K1/s ∪K2/s
2) K1/s =K1/s
3) ∀s ∈K1 ⇒ (K1/s)K2 ⊆ (K1K2)/s
2.1.3 Automata
Modeling a DES as a language is a good approach to study the theoretical aspect of dis-
crete events systems and theory of supervisory control. However, it is not practical for
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developing computational algorithms. For this purpose, other modeling methods such as
automaton and Petri nets are used. In this part we discuss automaton as a visual tool for
representing a DES. An automaton is also called a generator. A deterministic automaton is
a five-tuple:
G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm)
where Σ is the set of alphabet, X is the set of states with initial state x0, δ is the partial
transition function with δ ∶ X × Σ → X and Xm denotes the set of marked states. The
marked states typically signing the completion of a task or some reset mode. The behavior
of a DES G is described by its prefix-closed language and marked language.
L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗ ∣ δ(x0, s) is defined}
Lm(G) = {s ∈ L(G) ∣ δ(x0, s) ∈Xm}.
2.1.4 Operations on Automata
Definition 2.5. Equivalent automata We say that two automata G1 and G2 are equivalent
iff L(G1) = L(G2) and Lm(G1) = Lm(G2).
Definition 2.6. Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm). The automaton G is reachable if there is a path
to every state, x, from the initial state, x0. In other words, for every x ∈ X , there exists a
trace s such that δ(x0, s) = x is defined. The reachable subautomaton of G is denoted by
Gr.
Definition 2.7. Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm). The automaton G is coreachable if there is a
path from every state to a marked state.
An automaton is said to be nonblocking if there exists a path from every reachable
state to a marked state. The formal definition of nonblocking (for deterministic automaton
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) given in terms of its languages is provided below.
Definition 2.8. Nonblocking automaton An automaton G is called nonblocking if and
only if Lm(G) = L(G).
Next we discuss the trim and complement operation.
Definition 2.9. Trim operation: For an automatonG, Trim(G) is reachable and coreachable
subautomaton of G.
A generator is trim if all of its states are reachable and coreachable.
Definition 2.10. Complement: Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm), then Gcomp marks Lm(G) =
Σ⋆ −Lm(G) and generates Σ∗.
Definition 2.11. Product (Meet): Consider two automata:
G1 = (X1,Σ1, δ1, x0,1,Xm,1), G2 = (X2,Σ2, δ2, x0,2,Xm,2)
Then
G1 ×G2 ∶= Reachable part of (X1 ×X2,Σ1 ×Σ2, δ, (x0,1, x0,2),Xm,1 ×Xm,2)
where:




(δ1(x1, σ), δ(x2, σ)) if δ1(x1, σ) and δ(x2, σ) are defined
undefined otherwise
By the definition at the state (x1, x2) the event σ appears in G1 ×G2 if and only if G1
and G2 can execute σ from x1 and x2 respectively. Consequently, it can be shown that
product operation represents the intersection of languages of automata G1 and G2:
L(G1 ×G2) = L(G1) ∩L(G2)
Lm(G1 ×G2) = Lm(G1) ∩Lm(G2)
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The synchronous product is used in modeling the joint operation of two (or more) au-
tomata.
Definition 2.12. Synchronous Product (Parallel Composition) LetG1 = (X1,Σ1, δ1, x0,1,Xm,1)
and G2 = (X2,Σ2, δ2, x0,2,Xm,2). Then define:
G1 ∥ G2 ∶= Reachable part of(X1 ×X2,Σ1 ∪Σ2, δ, (x0,1, x0,2),Xm,1 ×Xm,2)
where








if σ ∈ Σ1 ∩Σ2 ∧ δ1(x1, σ)! ∧ δ2(x2, σ)!
if σ ∈ Σ1 −Σ2 ∧ δ1(x1, σ)!
if σ ∈ Σ2 −Σ1 ∧ δ2(x2, σ)!
otherwise
The supervisory control theory partitions the event set into two disjoint sets, control-
lable and uncontrollable, denoted by Σc and Σuc respectively. Assume the legal marked
behavior is represented by with a language K. The objective is to design a supervisor V
that limits the behavior of the plant G to its legal behavior K with ensuring nonblocking
property of the system under supervision V /G, by disabling only controllable events. The
supervisor itself is a map V ∶ Σ∗ → Γ where Γ = {γ ∈ 2Σ ∣ γ ⊇ Σuc}. We present a
preliminary on supervisory control in the next section.
2.2 Supervisory Control
In the supervisory control theory which is introduced by Ramadge and Wonham [2], the
plant is modeled by an automaton G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm). The theory partitions the event




V(s) s = σ1....σn
Figure 2.1: Supervisory control scheme
Σc and Σuc respectively. The objective is to limit the marked behavior of the plant to a
desirable legal sublanguage K by disabling some controllable events while assuring that
the nonblocking property holds for the system under supervision. Supervisory control is
a feedback control as shown in Figure 2.1. The supervisor observes events which are
generated by the plant. Considering the legal behavior K, the supervisor V makes the
control decision about the enablement of events. The supervisor must also ensure that the
system under supervision is nonblocking.
For s ∈ L(G), V (s) denotes the set of enabled events by the supervisor. Note that
V can not disable any uncontrollable event. The language generated by the plant under
supervision of supervisor V , L(G,V ), can be recursively defined as:
1)  ∈ L(G,V )
2) If s ∈ L(G,V ) and σ ∈ V (s), then sσ ∈ L(G,V )
Further, the marked language of the plant under supervision, Lm(G,V ), is defined by the
following equation:
Lm(G,V ) = Lm(G) ∩L(G,V )
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Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem (NSCP)
As previously discussed supervisory control aims to design a supervisor which limits the
behavior of the plant under supervision to legal language while maintaining nonblocking
property for the system under supervision. The Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem
(NSCP) is described in the following.
Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem: Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm) and Σ = Σc ⊍
Σuc. Also suppose the legal marked behavior of the plant is described by K ⊆ Lm(G) and
K ≠ ∅. Find a supervisor V such that:
1) Lm(G,V ) ⊆K
2) L(G,V ) = Lm(G,V )
A supervisor which solves NSCP is called a nonblocking supervisor. There is no
unique solution for NCSP in general. Define:
V ∶= {V ∣ V solves NSCP}
A supervisor V is called to be maximally permissive if
∀V ′ ∈ V ∶ Lm(G,V ) ⊆ Lm(G,V ) ∧L(G,V ) ⊆ L(G,V )
The following definitions are necessary for introducing the solution to NSCP.
Definition 2.13. Controllability Let Σu ⊆ Σ be the set of uncontrollable events and au-




It is easy to show that if the language K is not controllable, it has a supremal controllable
sublanguage denoted by supC(K,G). (IfK is controllable, thenK = supC(K,G))
Definition 2.14. L
m
(G)-closure: We say that a languageK ⊆ Lm(G) is Lm(G)-closed if
K =K ∩Lm(G)
Obviously, ∅ is Lm(G)-closed. It is easy to show that Lm(G)-closure is preserved under
the union operation of languages and consequently any languageK has a supremal Lm(G)-
closed sublanguage which is denoted by supR(K,G). The supremal Lm(G)-closed sub-
language of K can be calculated with the formula supR(K,G) =K − (Lm(G) −K)Σ∗.
Lemma 2.2. [41] If a language K is Lm(G)-closed, then supC(K,G) remains Lm(G)-
closed.
Theorem 2.1. [41] Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm), Σu ⊆ Σ be the set of uncontrollable events.
Also suppose K ⊆ Lm(G) be a nonempty language. Then there exists a supervisor V such
that Lm(G,V ) =K and L(G,V ) =K if:
1) K is controllable w.r.t G ∶KΣu ∩L(G) ⊆K
2) K is Lm(G)-closed ∶K ∩Lm(G) =K
Optimal Solution to NSCP
We previously formulated the NSCP. Note that in the case of full-observation, there always
exists a maximally permissive (optimal) supervisor which solves NSCP. The optimal solu-
tion for NSCP is characterized by the supremal Lm(G)-closed, controllable sublanguage of
the legal languageK. By Lemma 2.2, the supremal controllable sublanguage of an Lm(G)-
closed language remains Lm(G)-closed. Consequently, the maximally permissive solution
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is obtained by first finding supR(K,G) (if K is not Lm(G)-closed) and then applying the
supR(K,G) and then applying the operator supC( ,G).
2.2.1 Robust Supervisory Control
In the conventional (non-robust) supervisory control, it is assumed that the model of the
system is known and it does not change over time. On the other hand, this is not always
the case. In some problems the system can change over time or there might be other
uncertainties in the modeling of the system. It is then necessary to take the uncertainty
of modeling into account. Robust supervisory control is developed to cover these cases.
There are several ways for modeling the uncertainty and consequently for the formula-
tion of robust supervisory control. We are interested in the problem of robust supervisory
control studied in [21] and [23].
Problem Formulation
Suppose the model of the system belongs to a finite set of possible models G = {G1, ...,Gn}.
Each model has its own legal marked behaviorKi ⊆ Lm(Gi). It is assumed that if an event
α belongs to the event sets of Gi and Gj (i ≠ j), then α controllable (respectively uncon-
trollable) for Gi implies α controllable (respectively uncontrollable) for Gj . In the Robust
Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem (RNSCP) the goal is to design a supervisor V
such that Lm(Gi, V ) ⊆ Ki and Lm(Gi, V ) = L(Gi, V ) (i = 1, ..., n). Let G be a DES
such that L(G) = ⋃ni=1L(Gi) and Lm(G) = ⋃ni=1Lm(Gi). The answers to RNSCP can be
expressed using the following sublanguages. ForK ⊆ Σ∗ define:
1. Controllable sublanguages of K
C(K,G) = {E ⊆K ∣ EΣuc ∩L(G) ⊆ E}.
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2. Lm(G)-closed sublanguages ofK
R(K,G) = {E ⊆K ∣ E ∩Lm(G) = E}.
3. Gi-nonblocking sublanguages ofK
Nb(K,Gi) = {E ⊆K ∣ E ∩Lm(Gi) = E ∩L(Gi)}.
The set of controllable, Lm(G)-closed and Gi-nonblocking sublanguages of K is de-
fined as:
RCNb(K,G) = R(K,G) ∩C(K,G) ∩Nb(K,G1) ∩ ... ∩Nb(K,Gn).
The set RCNb(K,G) of sublanguages of K is nonempty and closed under union and
hence has a supremal element denoted byK⋆ [23].
Theorem 2.2. [23] Consider RNSCP and let
K = Lm(G) ∩ ( n⋂
i=1
(Ki ∪ (Σ∗ −Lm(Gi))))
For every nonempty element of RCNb(K,G), Ks, there exists a supervisor V which
solves RNSCP with Lm(G,V ) = Ks and vice versa. In particular, K∗ = supRCNb(K,G)
characterizes the maximally permissive solution of RNSCP.
The language K is the overall specification of RNSCP which includes all the strings
which are not illegal in any of the possible models. Two problems that can be treated as







Figure 2.2: System with “n” permanent failure modes.
Example 2.1. Fault recovery [22], [23] in DES can be treated as a special case of Ro-
bust Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem. The system is initially assumed to be
in the normal mode where no failure has happened. Assume that there exist “n” perma-
nent failure events in the system. Considering a single fault scenario, the state of the sys-
tem can be in Xn,XF1 , ...,orXFn (Figure Figure 2.2). The normal and each faulty mode
has its own legal specification. Thus the problem is an example of robust control with
G = {GN ,GNF1 , ...,GNFn}. Here GNFi is the subautomaton containing states Xn ∪XFi .
The goal is to design a supervisor such that each model under supervision meets its corre-
sponding specification and be nonblocking. This problem can be formulated as a special
case of RNSCP.
Example 2.2. Supervisory control with multiple sets of marked states [5] can be mod-
eled as a RNSCP. Assume that we are given a plant G = (X,Σ, x0, δ,Xm1 , ...Xmn) with
multiple sets of marked states and specifications Ki ⊆ Lim(G) where Lim(G) represents
marked language with only states in Xmi marked. This problem can be treated as a robust
problem with G = {G1, ...,Gn} where Gi = (X,σ, x0, δ,Xmi). Each model has its own
specificationKi ⊆ Lm(Gi) = Lim(G).
As an example, consider G = {G1,G2} as shown in Figure 2.3. Assume that all se-
quences are legal. We want to synthesize a robust supervisor V such that Lm(Gi, V ) =
L(Gi, V ) for i = 1,2, i.e., the plant under supervision is nonblocking with respect to































(b) Xm2 = {5,6}
Figure 2.3: Supervisory control with multiple sets of marked states.
As a practical example of this kind, consider a propulsion system with two engines as
depicted in Figure 2.4. The first set of marked states includes all the states where both
engines are off. The second (resp. third) set of marked states includes all states where only
engine one (resp. two) is fired. We want to switch from one configuration to another at
anytime as required. Also, as a safety requirement, we must avoid the states where both
engines are fired simultaneously. This problem can be regarded as control with multiple
marked state sets and hence a special case of RNSCP.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.4: Application of supervisory control with multiple sets of marked states.
2.2.2 Online Supervisory Control
In the conventional (non-robust) supervisory control supervisor is entirely designed and im-
plemented before the system begins operation. This approach is called off-line supervisory
control. As an alternative to off-line approach [7] introduced an online supervisory con-
trol framework based on Limited Lookahead Policies. In this approach the control action
is computed online while the plant (under supervision) is operational. The computation
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repeats each time the plant executes an event [7].
Limited Lookahead Policies
Limited Lookahead Policy supervisor first proposed by [7] computes the control action
based on the knowledge about plant’s behavior and its legal language up toN−step beyond
the currently executed trace. N is a fixed number which is determined before the plant starts
operation. The choice of N , can for instance, be imposed by the amount of information
available from future behavior of the system or by limitations of the controller such as
processing power or available memory.
The prediction about future behavior of a plant is in the form of a tree expansion. A
tree structure is useful and simple since it distinguishes between the states based on their
event history and it makes no assumption about equivalence of the strings.
LLP supervisor: General Scenario
LetG be the automaton representation of a system under supervision. Also letK ⊆ Lm(G)
be the nonempty legal marked behavior of G. Σuc and Σc denote the set of uncontrol-
lable and controllable events respectively. The objective is to design an online supervi-
sor γN that restricts the behavior of the plant to its specification (i.e., Lm(G,γN) ⊆ K)
while maintaining nonblocking property for the system under supervision nonblocking, i.e.
Lm(G,γN) = L(G,γN). The procedure can be described in five steps Figure 2.5:
1. Based one the knowledge available about the plant, the supervisor predicts the pos-
sible behavior of the plant N step beyond the currently executed trace s. This is the
function of block fN
L(G)
to build the tree-expansion of the model.
2. The supervisor then determines which traces in the tree-expansion of G are illegal.
String st is illegal if and only if st ∉ K. Removing illegal string is to be done by the







fN⇑fNL(G) fNK fNa fNu γN(s)
L(G), Lm(G),Kσ
Figure 2.5: Block diagram of Limited Lookahead Supervisor
3. [7] introduced the notion of pending traces as traces of length N in tree-expansion
which are not in the illegal region. A pending trace may continue into illegal region
by executing uncontrollable events. Therefore, the block fNa modifies the tree expan-
sion by adopting an optimistic or a conservative attitude toward the pending traces.
conservative attitude treats all pending traces as illegal as they may lead to an illegal
string with an uncontrollable sequence. On the contrary, the optimistic attitude treats
all pending traces as legal and marked.
4. Afterward, the block fN⇑ computes the supremal controllable part of the output of
block fNa with respect to the tree-expansion G/s∣N .
5. Finally, the block fNu finds the enabled events for the currently executed string s by
restricting the output of block fN⇑ to its first level and then adding all the enabled
uncontrollable events to it.
One can see that after generating the tree expansion of the plant, the rest is very similar
to the conventional supervisory control. There are three main issues in this framework.
First, what if the supremal controllable sublanguage of K/s∣N becomes empty in some
strings and for some length of lookahead windows. The second issue is to investigate about
the effect of choosing an attitude on effectiveness of the proposed methods. Finally, the
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third concern is to find conditions under which the proposed method results in a maximally
permissive supervision. The following results are from [7].
Definition 2.15. If fN(s) = ∅ for some s ∈ L(G,γN), then we say that there is a Run-Time
Error (RTE) at s. If s =  then then it is called a Starting Error (SE).
Definition 2.16. An LLP supervisor with control policy γN is called maximally permissive
if and only if L(G,γN) = supC(K,G).
The following lemmas address the occurrence of RTE and SE in LLP supervision.
Lemma 2.3. If there is no SE in L(G,γNcons), then supC(K,G) ≠ ∅.
The above lemma states that conservative LLP supervisor is a pessimistic supervisor.
In other words, if supC(K,G) = ∅, then SE would definitely happens with conservative
attitude. This is not necessarily the case for the optimistic LLP supervisor.
Proposition 2.1. supC(K,G) ⊆ L(G,γN+1opt ) ⊆ L(G,γNopt).
The above proposition says that the optimistic LLP supervisor is more permissive than
the optimal supervisor. It becomes less permissive as it receives more information about
the plant if longer lookahead window is used.
Proposition 2.2. In general L(G,γNcons) ⊆ L(G,γN+1cons) ⊆ supC(K,G).
In other words, the conservative LLP supervisor is less permissive compared with the
optimal solution. It approaches the optimal solution as we increase the length of lookahead
window.
The next issue in LLP supervision is to determine if there exist conditions for maximal
permissiveness of the LLP supervisor. The conditions are presented in the following. These
conditions are considered for both prefixed-closed and non-closed specifications.
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Prefix-closed specificationK =K:
In this case we do not care about the marking. The following definition formalizes the
length of longest uncontrollable string in K, the parameter which plays an important role
in determining the length of sufficient window size.
Definition 2.17. The length of the longest uncontrollable subtrace of strings in K is de-





max{∣s∣ ∶ s ∈ Σ∗u ∧ (∃v, u ∈ Σ∗ ∣ vsu ∈K)} if exists
undefined otherwise
Theorem 2.3. If K =K and N ≥ Nu(K) + 2, then γNopt is maximally permissive.
Theorem 2.4. If K = K, no SE happens at L(G,γNcons) and N ≥ Nu(K) + 2, then γNcons is
maximally permissive.
General CaseK ⊆K:
In this more general case the marking is important and the LLP supervisor needs to ensure
that the system under supervision is nonblocking. Thus, we expect the length of sufficient
lookahead window to be even longer than the prefix-closed case. We need the following
definitions before presenting the theorems on the length of sufficient lookahead window for
optimality.
Definition 2.18. The set of all legal marked traces in which the active event set is control-
lable is formalized as:
Kmc = {s ∈K ∶ (∀σ ∈ Σu)sσ ∉ L(G)}
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The set of all traces that cross the boundary between K and L(G) −K by executing a
sequence of uncontrollable events is formalized as the language
Kfc = ((L(G) −K)/Σu) ∩K
Definition 2.19. Nmcfc is the length of the longest subtrace in K which leads the plant to
an illegal state from the initial state or a marked state without generating any marked legal





max{∣t∣ ∶ ∃s ∈ (Kmc ∪ {})st ∈Kfc ∧ (∀ < v < t)sv ∉ (Kfc ∪Kmc)} if exists
undefined otherwise
Definition 2.20. Kmcmc is the length of longest subtrace in K which leads the plant from






max{∣t∣ ∶ ∃s ∈ (Kmc ∪ {})st ∈Kmc ∧ (∀ < v < t)sv ∉Kmc} if exists
undefined otherwise
Theorem 2.5. [7] Assume supC(K,G) ≠ ∅ and N ≥ Nmcfc(K) + 1 then γNopt is a valid
LLP supervisor.
Theorem 2.6. [7] Assume no SE happens in L(G,γNcons) and N ≥ Nmcmc(K) + 1. Then
γNcons is a maximally permissive LLP supervisor and L(G,γNcons) = supC(K,G).
Theorem 2.6 formalizes the most useful case in the LLP supervision framework since:
• It deals with the general case K ≠K.
• Conservative supervisor is always an admissible supervisor while optimistic LLP su-
pervisor may lead the system to blocking or even illegal region since supC(K,G) ⊆
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L(G,γNopt)
As a consequence, in this thesis we focus our efforts to generalize Theorem 2.6 to the
the case of robust supervisory control.
Other Preliminaries
The following lemmas are also needed to prove the results of this thesis.
Lemma 2.4. [6] For L,K ⊆ Σ∗ we have L ∪LK = LK.
Lemma 2.5. For three sets A,B,C
(A −B) ∩C = (A ∩C) − (B ∩C)
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter provides the background that is needed in the developments of this thesis. A
brief background in discrete event models, robust supervisory control, and online supervi-
sory control has been covered.
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Chapter 3
Limited Lookahead Policy for Robust
Nonblocking Supervisory Control:
A Linguistic Approach
As with many other areas of control theory, the notion of online control has been introduced
to supervisory control of discrete event systems by the lookahead policies. In this setting,
it is assumed that the behavior of the plant under supervision is known a few steps beyond
the currently executed trace. The most one word setting of online supervisory control in
term of implementation and putting into practice is the Limited Lookahead Policies (LLP),
where all possible behaviors of the plant and its legal behavior are known up to N steps
beyond the currently executed trace (whereN is fixed number). In Chapter 2, we discussed
the LLP for supervisory control of DES introduced in [7], where it is assumed that the exact
model of plant is known and there is no uncertainty associated with the modeling. In this
chapter, we extend the results of [7] to the case of robust control where the plant model is
assumed to belong to a given finite set of DES models.
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3.1 Problem Formulation
This section is intended to formulate the Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem
based on Limited Lookahead policy (RNSCP-LL). The problem studied here is an exten-
sion of the problem studied in [7] to the case of robust control. Consider a DES whose true
model is one of the G1, ...,Gn. Let Σi and Σc,i denote the event set and the set of control-
lable events of Gi. The event sets are not necessarily the same; however it is assumed that
all plants agree on the controllability status of the events. This means that if σ ∈ Σi ∩ Σj ,
then σ is controllable in Gi if and only if σ is controllable in Gj . The set of all events is
denoted by Σ = ∑ni=1Σi, and Σc = ∑ni=1Σci ⊆ Σ is the set of all controllable events.
For each plant it is assumed that a nonempty language Ki ⊆ Lm(Gi) describes the
legal behavior for marked traces. The problem is to design an online supervisor based
on the available knowledge about the behavior of the plants a fixed “N” steps beyond the
currently executed trace s. The supervisor is supposed to generate the control law based
on the available information in the tree expansions of Gis. The resulting Robust Limited
Lookahead (RLL) supervisor must ensure the legality and nonblocking properties of the
plants under supervision:
(1) L(Gi, γN) ⊆Ki, i = 1, ..., n
(2) Lm(Gi, γN) = L(Gi, γN), i = 1, ..., n
where L(Gi, γN) and Lm(Gi, γN) are the closed and marked behaviors of Gi under
supervision of the RLL supervisor γN .
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3.2 Robust Limited Lookahead Supervision
3.2.1 General Scenario
A new online approach for Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control (RNSC) problem
based on LLP is introduced in this section. It is an extension of LLP in [7] to the case of
robust control. Figure 3.1 shows the block diagram of the RLL supervisor. Suppose that
the process has been executed trace s so far. The online control functions in Figure 3.1 are
described in the following:
1. Suppose that the plant under supervision has executed string s so far. Based on the
knowledge about the behavior of Gi, i = 1, ..., n, the supervisor determines whether
plant Gi is compatible with the currently executed trace s. This is the function of
block f sG; without loss of generality, suppose that the first n
′ plants are compatible
with the trace s.
2. On the basis of knowledge available about the plants, the supervisor predicts the pos-
sible behavior of all compatible plant models N step beyond the currently executed
trace s. The function of block fN
L(G)
is to build tree-expansions of the models.
3. The supervisor then determines which traces in the tree expansion of Gi are illegal.
String s is illegal if and only if s ∉K. We define K according to:
K = Lm(G) ∩ ( n⋂
i=1
(Ki ∪ (Σ∗ −Lm(Gi)))) (3.1)















L(G) fNK fNa fNu
L(Gi), Lm(Gi),Ki
Gi
i = 1, ..., n
γN(s)
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of Robust Limited Lookahead Supervisor
4. [7] introduced the notion of pending traces as traces of length N in tree-expansion
which are not in the illegal region. A pending trace may continue into illegal region
by executing uncontrollable events. Therefore the block fNa modifies the tree expan-
sion by adopting a conservative attitude toward the pending traces, which means that
all pending traces as treated as illegal [7].
5. Afterward, the block fN⇑ computes the supremal Lm(G)-closed, controllable, and
Gi/s-nonblocking part of the output of block fNa with respect to the tree expansions
of Gi/s.
6. Finally, the block fNu finds the enabled events for the currently executed string s, by
determining the element in every sequence in the output of the block fN⇑ .
3.2.2 Formalizing RLL Supervisor
The previously mentioned six steps are formally expressed in this section.
1. f sG determines if s ∈ L(Gi) (Gi is compatible with s).
2. fN
L(G)
○ f sG = (L(G/s∣N), Lm(G/s∣N)) where G/s∣N is the union of tree expansion of
Gi, i = 1, ..., n′ up to N steps after the execution of trace s. The block also passes
G/s∣N and Gi/s∣N to the other blocks for the computation of supremal elements.
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3. fNK ○ fNL(G) ○ f sG = (K/s∣N ,K/s∣N) where K is the legal behavior of robust problem
which is described by Equation 3.1.
4. fNa ○ fNK ○ fNL(G) ○ f sG =K/s∣N − (K/s∣N −K/s∣N−1) =K/s∣N−1 which means that we
treat all the pending traces as illegal.
5. fN(s) ∶= fN⇑ ○ fNa ○ fNK ○ fNL(G) ○ f sG = supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N)
computes the supremal Lm(G/s∣N)-closed, controllable, and Gi/s∣N -nonblocking
(i = 1, ..., n′) part ofK/s∣N−11.
6. Finally, the control action γN(s) is determined through fNu block γN(s) ∶= fNu ○
fN(s) ∶= fN(s) ∩Σ.
So the closed and marked languages of the plants under supervision can be defined
recursively as follows:
• ε ∈ L(Gi, γN(s));
• ∀s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ ∶ s ∈ L(Gi, γN(s)), sσ ∈ L(Gi), σ ∈ γN(s) ⇒ sσ ∈ L(Gi, γN(s)).
3.3 Properties of RLL Supervisor
In this section we prove some general properties of the RLL supervisor for a given looka-
head window size N . In the following section, we will discuss how N can be chosen.
The following lemma and proposition are required for the proof of the monotonicity
property (Theorem 3.1).
Lemma 3.1. Let s ∈ Σ∗. Then:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) = supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N+1)





∆Li = L(Gi/s∣N+1) −L(Gi/s∣N)
∆Lm,i =∆Li ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N+1)
∆L = L(G/s∣N+1) −L(G/s∣N)
∆Lm =∆L ∩Lm(G/s∣N+1)
Note that ∀s ∈∆Li → ∣s∣ = N + 1. First we prove that LHS ⊆ RHS. For this we prove
that LHS is relative closed and controllable with respect to G/s∣N+1 and nonblocking with
respect to Gi/s∣N+1, i = 1, ..., n′.
i) G-nonblocking: Since LHS is Gi/s∣N -nonblocking we have:
LHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N) = LHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N)
Also LHS ∩∆Li = LHS ∩∆Lm,i = ∅. Thus:
LHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N+1) = LHS ∩ (Lm(Gi/s∣N) ∪∆Lm,i)
= LHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N) ∪LHS ∩∆Lm,i
= (LHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N)) ∪ (LHS ∩∆Li)
= LHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N+1)
ii) Controllability: By assumption, LHSΣu ∩ L(G/s∣N) ⊆ LHS. Also, we know ∀t ∈
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LHS the ∣t∣ ⩽ N−1. So for all t ∈ LHS and σ ∈ Σ ∣tσ∣ ≤ N and thus LHSΣu∩∆L = ∅.
LHSΣu ∩L(G/s∣N+1) = LHSΣu ∩ (L(G/s∣N) ∪∆L)
= (LHSΣu ∩L(G/s∣N)) ∪ (LHSΣu ∩∆L)
⊆ LHS
iii) Lm(G)-Closure: We know that LHS ∩ Lm(G/s∣N) = LHS and LHS ∩∆Lm = ∅.
Thus we can easily conclude that LHS ∩ Lm(G/s∣N+1) = LHS ∩ (Lm(G/s∣N) ∪
∆Lm) = LHS.
Now we prove the second part RHS ⊆ LHS following a similar procedure.
i) G-nonblocking: Since RHS is Gi/s∣N+1-nonblocking, we have:
RHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N+1) = RHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N+1)
Also RHS ∩∆Li = RHS ∩∆Lm,i = ∅. Thus:
RHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N) = RHS ∩ (Lm(Gi/s∣N) ∪∆Lm,i)
= RHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N+1)
= RHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N+1)
= RHS ∩ (L(Gi/s∣N) ∪∆Li)
= RHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N)
ii) Controllability: By assumption, RHSΣu ∩ L(G/s∣N+1) ⊆ RHS. Also, we know ∀t ∈
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RHS, ∣t∣ ⩽ N −1. So for all t ∈ RHS and σ ∈ Σ ∣tσ∣ ≤ N and thus RHSΣu∩∆L = ∅.
RHSΣu ∩L(G/s∣N) = RHSΣu ∩ (L(G/s∣N) ∪∆L)
= RHSΣu ∩L(G/s∣N+1)
⊆ RHS
iii) Lm(G)-Closure: By assumption,RHS∩Lm(G/s∣N+1) = RHS andRHS∩∆Lm = ∅.
Thus we can easily conclude thatRHS∩Lm(G/s∣N) = RHS∩(Lm(G/s∣N)∪∆Lm) =
RHS ∩Lm(G/s∣N+1) = RHS.
Similar to Lemma 3.1 we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let s ∈ Σ∗. Then:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) = supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s)
Proof: The proof is very similar to Lemma 3.1 and it is removed for brevity.
The following theorem establishes the expected results that a larger lookahead window
results in a more permissive supervision. The theorem generalizes the result which was
first presented as Theorem 4.5 in [7] and [27].
Theorem 3.1. (Monotonicity) L(G,γN) ⊆ L(G,γN+1)
Proof: It is enough to show that (∀s ∈ Σ∗) fN(s) ⊆ fN+1(s). By definition:
fN(s) ∶= supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N)
= supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N+1) (by Lemma 3.1)
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But we know that
(K/s∣N−1) ⊆ (K/s∣N) ⇒ supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N+1) ⊆ supRCNb(K/s∣N ,G/s∣N+1)
⇒ supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) ⊆ supRCNb(K/s∣N ,G/s∣N+1)
⇒ fN(s) ⊆ fN+1(s)
Remark 3.1. The monotonicity property of union model under supervision can be easily
extended to each of the plants with exactly the same procedure and hence L(Gi, γN) ⊆
L(Gi, γN+1), i = 1, ..., n.
The following lemma generalizes Theorem A.1 of [7]. It will be needed later to prove
Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.2.
1)(∀s ∈ Σ∗) supRCNb(K,G)/s ⊆ supRCNb(K/s,G/s)
2)(∀s ∈ supRCNb(K,G)) supRCNb(K,G)/s = supRCNb(K/s,G/s)
Proof: For notational simplicity let
H ∶= supRCNb(K,G)
1) We need to show that i) H/s ⊆ K/s, ii) H/s is nonblocking with respect to Gi/s,
i = 1, ..., n, iii) H/s is relative closed with respect to G/s and iv) H/s is controllable with
respect to G/s. Clearly,H/s ⊆K/s. We first show thatH/s is nonblocking with respect to
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Gi/s.
H ∩Lm(Gi) =H ∩L(Gi) ⇒ (H ∩Lm(Gi))/s = (H ∩L(Gi))/s
⇒ (H ∩Lm(Gi))/s = (H ∩L(Gi))/s (by Lemma 2.1)
⇒ H/s ∩Lm(Gi/s) =H/s ∩L(Gi/s)
⇒ H/s ∩Lm(Gi/s) =H/s ∩L(Gi/s)
Next we show that H/s is relative closed with respect to G/s.
H/s ∩Lm(G/s) = H/s ∩Lm(G)/s (part 2, Lemma 2.1)
= (H ∩Lm(G))/s (part 1, Lemma 2.1)
= H/s (since H is Lm(G)-closed)
Finally, we show that H/s is controllable with respect to G/s.
H/sΣu ∩L(G/s) = H/sΣu ∩L(G/s) (part 2, Lemma 2.1)
⊆ HΣu/s ∩L(G/s) (part 3, Lemma 2.1)
= (HΣu ∩L(G))/s (part 1, Lemma 2.1)
⊆ H/s (since H is controllable)
= H/s
2) Based on the result of part 1, we only need to prove the reverse containment:
supRCNb(K/s,G/s) ⊆ supRCNb(K,G)/s
For simplicity let H ′ ∶= supRCNb(K/s,G/s). So, we need to show H ′ ⊆ H/s or equiva-
lently sH ′ ⊆ H . Since H is supremal relative-closed, controllable with respect to G , and
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Gi-nonblocking sublanguage ofK, it is enough to show thatH∪sH ′ is also relative-closed,
and controllable with respect to G and Gi-nonblocking sublanguage ofK. This means that
we need to show that H ∪ sH ′ ⊆ H . First we show that H ∪ sH ′ is Gi-nonblocking. Note
that H ′ is Gi/s-nonblocking.
(H ∪ sH ′) ∩Lm(Gi) = H ∩Lm(Gi) ∪ (sH ′ ∩Lm(Gi))
= H ∩Lm(Gi) ∪ s(H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/s))
= H ∩Lm(Gi) ∪ (s ∪ s (H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/s))) (by Lemma 2.4)
= (H ∩L(Gi)) ∪ s ∪ s (H ′ ∩L(Gi/s))
= (H ∩L(Gi)) ∪ ((s ∪ sH ′) ∩ (s ∪L(Gi)))
= (H ∩L(Gi)) ∪ (sH ′ ∩ (s ∪L(Gi)))
⊇ (H ∩L(Gi)) ∪ (sH ′ ∩L(Gi))
= (H ∪ sH ′) ∩L(Gi)
Next we show that H ∪ sH ′ is controllable with respect to G. Since s ∈ H we have
sΣu ∩ L(G) ⊆ H . Also, H ′ is controllable with respect to G/s or equivalently sH ′Σu ∩
L(G) ⊆ sH ′. Thus:
(s ∪ sH ′)Σu ∩L(G) ⊆ (H ∪ sH ′)
sH ′Σu ∩L(G) ⊆ H ∪ sH ′ (by Lemma 2.4)
SinceH is controllable with respect toG itself, we can easily see thatH ∪ sH ′Σu∩L(G) ⊆
H ∪ sH ′. Next we show that H ∪ sH ′ is relative closed with respect to G. s ∩Lm(G) ⊆H
since s ∈ H and H is relative-closed with respect to G. Also by assumption we have
H ′ ∩ Lm(G)/s ⊆ H ′ or equivalently, sH ′ ∩ Lm(G) ⊆ sH ′. Considering the union of two
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equations we have:
(s ∪ sH ′) ∩Lm(G) ⊆ H ∪ sH ′
sH ′ ∩Lm(G) ⊆ H ∪ sH ′ (by Lemma 2.4)
By assumption H is relative-closed with respect to G and consequently, H ∩Lm(G) = H .
Therefore (H ∪ sH ′) ∩Lm(G) ⊆H ∪ sH ′ and finally:
H ∪ sH ′ ∩Lm(G) ⊆ H ∪ sH ′
Since the reverse containment always holds, we have proved thatH ∪sH ′ is relative-closed
with respect to G. This completes the proof.
The following lemmas are required to prove Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3. Theorem
3.2 explains the admissibility of the RLL supervisor.
Lemma 3.3. Let s ∈ Σ∗. Then:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) ⊆ supRCNb(K/s,G/s)
Proof:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) = supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s) (by Proposition 3.1)
⊆ supRCNb(K/s,G/s) (sinceK/s∣N−1 ⊆K/s)
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Lemma 3.4. Let s ∈ Σ∗. Then:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N)/σ ⊆ supRCNb(K/sσ∣N−1,G/sσ∣N)
Proof:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N)/σ = supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N+1)/σ (by Lemma 3.1)
⊆ supRCNb(K/s∣N ,G/s∣N+1)/σ (since K/s∣N−1 ⊆K/s∣N )
⊆ supRCNb(K/s∣N/σ,G/s∣N+1/σ) (by Lemma 3.2, part 1)
= supRCNb(K/sσ∣N−1,G/sσ∣N)
In the following we define the notions of starting error and run-time error similar to
[7].
Definition 3.1. We say that there is a run-time error (RTE) in L(G,γN) at string s ∈
L(G,γN) if fN(s) = ∅. An RTE is said to be a Starting Error (SE) if s = . We say there
is no RTE in L(G,γN) if no RTE happens for all s ∈ L(G,γN).
The following theorem states that in the absence of SE, the RLL supervisor is always
nonblocking and admissible.
Theorem 3.2. If there is no SE in L(G,γN), then L(G,γN) ⊆ supRCNb(K,G).
Proof: We use induction on the length of s to prove this. For ∣s∣ = 0, s = . By definition
 ∈ L(G,γN). Also, since there is no SE, supRCNb(K,G) ≠ ∅; this implies that  ∈
supRCNb(K,G). So we have the base step by assumption. For the induction step, let
s = s′σ where σ ∈ Σ. Since L(G,γN) is prefix closed we have s′ ∈ L(G,γN). On the
other hand, we have s′ ∈ supRCNb(K,G) by the induction hypothesis. Also, s = s′σ ∈
L(G,γN). By definition we have σ ∈ γN(s′), which means that σ ∈ fN(s) ∩ Σ. So, we
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need to show that if σ ∈ fN(s) ∩ Σ, then σ ∈ supRCNb(K,G)/ s′. Consider the case of
σ ∈ fN(s′) ∩Σ.
fN(s′) ∩Σ = supRCNb(K/s′∣N−1,G/s′∣N) ∩Σ
⊆ supRCNb(K/s′,G/s′) ∩Σ (by Lemma 3.3)
= supRCNb(K,G)/s′ ∩Σ (by Lemma 3.2, part 2)
= supRCNb(K,G)/s′ ∩Σ (by Lemma 2.1, part 2)
So σ also belongs to supRCNb(K,G)/ s′. This completes the proof.
The next theorem explains the relation between SE and RTE for a system under super-
vision of an RLL supervisor.
Theorem 3.3. If there is no SE in L(G,γN), then there is no RTE in L(G,γN).
Proof: In order to prove this theorem we use induction on the length of traces. Since there
is no SE in L(G,γN), there is no RTE at s = . In other words the base step holds by
assumption for ∣s∣ = 0. For the induction step, suppose that s = s′σ with σ ∈ Σ, where we




Since σ ∈ L(G,γN)/s′, we have:
σ ∈ γN(s′) = fN(s′) ∩Σ
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We can conclude that:
σ ∈ fN(s′) = supRCNb(K/s′∣N−1,G/s′∣N)
⇒ supRCNb(K/s′∣N−1,G/s′∣N)/σ ≠ ∅
So from Lemma 3.4 we can say that:
supRCNb(K/s′σ∣N−1,G/s′σ∣N) ≠ ∅
which means that there is no RTE at s = s′σ. This completes the proof.
3.4 Maximally Permissive RLL Supervisor
In this section we provide a set of conditions under which N can be chosen to ensure that
RLL is maximally permissive.
Definition 3.2. An RLL supervisor with control policy γN is called maximally permissive
if L(G,γN) = supRCNb(K,G).
For an RLL supervisor to be maximally permissive the size of lookahead window
should be large enough to cover the minimum number of safe traces in the lookahead
window for every prefix of legal marked behavior. By a safe trace we mean a trace which
is legal and Gi-nonblocking with respect to each of the plants. Also transitions of a safe
trace should be controllable. We call such traces to be nonblocking frontier traces as a
generalization of frontier traces in [7].
Definition 3.3. Given a set of plantsGi, i = 1, ..., n, the set of nonblocking traces is defined
as:
Knb ∶= {t ∈K ∣ t ∩Lm(Gi) = t ∩L(Gi) ∧ ∀σ ∈ Σu ∶ [tσ ∉ L(G)]}
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Also, we define the set of nonblocking frontier traces after the trace s ∈K as:
(K/s)nf ∶= Knb/s
= {t ∈K/s ∣ st ∩Lm(Gi) = st ∩L(Gi) ∧ ∀σ ∈ Σu ∶ [tσ ∉ L(G)/s]}
Further the set of neighboring nonblocking controllable frontier traces is defined as
follows:
(K/s)nnf ∶= {t ∈ (K/s)nf ∣ t ≠  ∧ [∀t′ < t ∶ t′ ∉ (K/s)nf ]}
where t′ < t means t ≤ t′ and t ≠ t′.
As will be discussed later, the length of the longest neighboring nonblocking control-
lable frontier trace plays a role in the length of sufficient lookahead window. Nnnf denotes





maxs∈K {maxt∈(K/s)nnf ∣t∣} if it exists (3.2)
undefined otherwise
Note that Nnnf is considered undefined if at least one of the sets in (3.2) is unbounded
or if all the sets become empty. Also, in (3.2) max of empty set is taken to be zero.
The following lemmas are used to prove the main result.
Lemma 3.5. Let H ∈ RCNb(K/s,G/s) and s ∈ supRCNb(K,G). Suppose for t ∈H:
1. t ∩Lm(Gi/s) = t ∩L(Gi/s)
2. ∀σ ∈ Σu ∶ [tσ ∉ L(G/s)]
Then H − (t(H/t) − t) ∈ RCNb(K/s,G/s).
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Proof: H ′ = t(H/t) − t and H ′′ = t(H/t) − t. First we show that H −H ′ =H −H ′′.
H −H ′′ = [H −H ′ ∪H ′] − (tH/t − t)
= [H −H ′ − (tH/t − t)] ∪ [H ′ − (tH/t − t)]
= H −H ′ ∪ [H ′ − (tH/t − t)]
(H −H ′ and (tH/t − t) are disjoint)
= H −H ′ ∪ [t(H/t) − t − (tH/t − t)]
= H −H ′ ∪ [(t ∪ tH/t) − (tH/t − t)]
(by Lemma 2.4)
= H −H ′ ∪ [t ∪ (tH/t − (tH/t − t))]
= H −H ′ ∪ t ∪ t
= H −H ′ ∪ t
= H −H ′
To prove the Gi/s − nonblocking property consider two different cases.
1) t ∉ Lm(Gi)/s: By Lemma 2.5 we have
(H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s) = (H ∩Lm(Gi/s)) − (H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/s))
Since, in this case H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/s) = ∅ we conclude
(H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s) =H ∩Lm(Gi/s)
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Furthermore
H −H ′ ∩L(Gi/s) ⊆ H ∩L(Gi/s)
= H ∩Lm(Gi/s)
= (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s)
So, H −H ′ ∩ L(Gi/s) ⊆ (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s). Since the reverse containment always
holds we have H −H ′ ∩L(Gi/s) = (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s)
2) t ∈ Lm(Gi)/s: Therefore t ∈ L(Gi)/s. Now, consider:
(H −H ′) ∩L(Gi/s) = (H − (tH/t − t)) ∩L(Gi/s)
= (H ∩L(Gi/s)) − ((tH/t − t) ∩L(Gi/s))
= (H ∩L(Gi/s)) −∆LL (3.3)
where ∆LL ∶= (tH/t − t) ∩L(Gi/s). Next, let R = (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s) and consider:
H ∩Lm(Gi/s) = R ∪H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/s)
= R ∪ (t(H/t) − t) ∩Lm(Gi/s)
= R ∪ t(H/t − ) ∩Lm(Gi/s)
= R ∪ (t(H/t − ) ∩Lm(Gi/st) ∪ t)
= R ∪ tH/t ∩Lm(Gi/st) (since t ⊆ R)
= R ⊍ (tH/t ∩Lm(Gi/st) − t)
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Let ∆LR = (tH/t ∩Lm(Gi/st) − t), then:
(H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/s) =H ∩Lm(Gi/s) −∆LR (3.4)
Note that:
∆LR = tH/t ∩Lm(Gi/st) − t
= tH ∩Lm(Gi/s)/t − t (by Lemma 2.1)
= t(H ∩L(Gi/s))/t − t (H is Lm(Gi/s)-closed)
= t(H/t ∩L(Gi/st)) − t (by Lemma 2.1)
= (tH/t ∩L(Gi/s)) − t
= (tH/t − t) ∩L(Gi/s)
= ∆LL
From (3.3), (3.4), and Gi/s-nonblocking property of H it follows that H −H ′ is Gi/s −
nonblocking. For controllability we need to ensure that the behavior of L(G/s) can be
limited to H −H ′. This goal can be simply achieved by disabling the events after the trace
t, which we know are all controllable. Finally, for relative-closure:
H −H ′ ∩Lm(G/s) = (H − (tH/t − t)) ∩Lm(G/s)
= (H ∩Lm(G/s)) − ((tH/t − t) ∩Lm(G/s))
= H − ((tH/t ∩Lm(G/s)) − t) (since H is Lm(G/s)-closed)
= H − (t(H/t ∩Lm(G/st)) − t)
= H − (t(H/t) − t) (since H/t ∩Lm(G/s)/t =H/t)
= H −H ′
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This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose s ∈ supRCNb(K,G) and H = supRCNb(K/s,G/s). Then
(K/s)nnf ∩H ⊆H.
Proof: We know that (K/s)nnf ⊆ (K/s)nf ⊆K/s ⊆ Lm(G/s). Therefore:
(K/s)nnf ∩H ⊆ Lm(G/s) ∩H
= H (since H is Lm(G/s)-closed)
Theorem 3.4. Assume Knb = K and that there is no SE in L(G,γN). If N ≥ Nnnf + 1,
then L(G,γN) = supRCNb(K,G).
Proof: To prove the theorem we start with the language H ∶= supRCNb(K/s,G/s) and
then construct the language:
H ′ ∶=H − (K/s)nnfcΣ+
where Σ+ = Σ∗ − {}. By considering Lemma 3.6 and the definition of (K/s)nnf we
know that all traces in (K/s)nnf∩H satisfy the conditions for Lemma 3.5. Thus, by Lemma
3.5H ′ is also Gi/s−nonblocking, controllable, and Lm(G/s)-closed. In the following, we
first show thatH ′∣1 =H ∣1 andH ′ =H ′∣N−1 whereN = Nnnf+1. Consider the two following
cases:
1. (K/s)nf − {} ≠ ∅: In this case (K/s)nnf ≠ ∅. Obviously, H ′∣1 ⊆ H ∣1. So we only
need to show the reverse containment. Suppose t ∈ H ∣1 and therefore t ∈ H and
∣t∣ = 1. Thus there exists t′ such that tt′ ∈ H . If tt′ ∉ (K/s)nnfΣ+, then tt′ ∈ H ′ and
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t ∈H ′∣1. If tt′ ∈ (K/s)nnfΣ+, then there exists t′′ < t′ such that tt′′ ∈ (K/s)nnf ∩H ⊆
H ′ and therefore t ∈H ′∣1. Consequently:
H ′∣1 =H ∣1
Now suppose that N = Nnnf + 1 and Knb = K. Suppose there exists t ∈ H,H ′
such that ∣t∣ ≥ N , then t ∈ H ⊆ H ⊆ K/s = Knb/s. Also, by Definition 3.3
Knb/s = (K/s)nf . Consequently, t ∈ (K/s)nf . Thus there exists t′ such that
tt′ ∈ (K/s)nf . This is equivalent to the existence of t′′ < tt′ such that t′′ ∈ (K/s)nnf .
Since N = Nnnf + 1, then ∣t′′∣ ≤ N − 1. Furthermore, since t′′ < t we conclude that
t ∈ (K/s)nnfΣ+. This contradicts the first assumption of t ∈ H ′. Thus ∣t∣ < N and
consequently:
H ′ =H ′∣N−1 ⊆K/s∣N−1
2. (K/s)nf −{} = ∅: In this caseKnnf/s = ∅. This means thatH ′ =H . Consequently:
H ′∣1 =H ∣1
On the other hand, H ′ =H ⊆K/s ⊆K/s ⊆ (K/s)nf = {}. This implies that:
H ′ =H ′∣N−1 ⊆K/s∣N−1
Therefore, similar to the Proposition 3.1 we can prove that:




⇒ H ′ = supRCNb(H ′,G/s∣N)
⊆ supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) ∶= fN(s)
⇒ H ′∣1 ⊆ fN(s)∣1
⇒ H ∣1 ⊆ fN(s)∣1
By induction on the length of traces of supRCNb(K,G) and consideration of the above
result for the induction step, we can conclude that L(G,γN) = supRCNb(K,G). Note that
the absence of SE is necessary to establish the base step.
Remark 3.2. The reader should note that in the special case of standard supervisory control
(number of plants under supervision is n = 1) the conditions in Theorem 3.4 reduce to
the conditions of Theorem 5.5 in [7]. Since Knb reduces to Kmc (which is the marked
controllable sub-language ofK) andNnnf becomes equal toNmcmc (the maximum distance
between two subsequent members ofKmc).
3.5 Example 1
Suppose G = {G1,G2} as shown in Figure 3.2, and the legal behavior of the plants are
described byK1 = {, b, bc, bcbg} andK2 = {, b, bc, bcag}. The marked states in Figure 3.2





































Figure 3.2: Plant automata
In the following we first present the off-line solution for the above mentioned problem.
3.5.1 Off-line Solution
First we synthesize a plant G where L(G) = L(G1) ∪ L(G2) and Lm(G) = Lm(G1) ∪
Lm(G2). The automaton of G is shown in Figure 3.3. The overall specification which is




























Figure 3.3: Union plant model G
We then solve the problem based on the algorithm presented in [23] to find supRCNb(K,G).









Figure 3.4: Realization of supervisor S
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Now that we know how the off-line solution works (i.e. allows only the sequence bcag),
we can go forward to the online solution.
3.5.2 Online Solution
In this example we focus on finding the maximally permissive RLL supervisor. First we
determine Nnnf .
Length of Lookahead Window
To determine Nnnf we have to determine (K/s)nf and (K/s)nnf for every s ∈K:
(K/)nf = {, b, bc, bcag, bcbg} , (K/)nnf = {b}
(K/b)nf = {, c, cag, cbg} , (K/b)nnf = {c}
(K/bc)nf = {, ag, bg} , (K/bc)nnf = {ag, bg}
(K/bcb)nf = {, g} , (K/bcb)nnf = {g}
(K/bca)nf = {, g} , (K/bca)nnf = {g}
(K/bcbg)nf = {} , (K/bcbg)nnf = {}
(K/bcag)nf = {} , (K/bcag)nnf = {}
Having the sets (K/s)nnf we find Nnnf = 2.
Control Action Computation
Setting lookahead window to N = 3 and considering that Knb = K, we expect L(G,γ3)
to be maximally permissive. Starting from s = , both models are compatible with the







So, the control action is γ3() = {b}. After executing event b, with s = b, the control
action is γ3(b) = {c}, and the output of block fN⇑ is as Figure 3.6. One can see that
executing further events, and going ahead through the lookahead window causes new events








Continuing with execution of the events the next control action would be γ3(bca) = {g}.
This shows that by choosing the window size long enough
L(G,γN) = supRCNb(K,G) = bcag.
3.6 Example 2
As previously discussed, a sufficient lookahead window size for optimality of RLL super-
visor is defined if and only if Nnnf is defined and bounded. However, this is not always
the case. In some problems the Nnnf may become undefined or unbounded. This affects
the performance of RLL supervisor. The next example illustrates a case where Nnnf is
unbounded.
Example 3.1. Consider G = {G1,G2} as shown in Figure 3.7. Assume that there is no ille-
gal behavior (Ki = Lm(Gi)). If s = , then (K/)nf = {umc, umc2, umc3, umc4 ∣ m is odd}

















Figure 3.7: RNSCP with unbounded Nnnf
To explain more about necessity of an unbounded window, consider the tree-expansion
of the union model after s =  as shown in Figure 3.8. We observe that for any bounded
length of lookahead window, there exists a path of uncontrollable events from the initial
state to a pending trace. As we are treating the pending traces to be illegal, for any bounded
window size we encounter a SE. However the off-line solution is non-empty. In the next
chapter, we propose an RLL supervisor with state information in order to address this issue





















Figure 3.8: Tree-expansion of the RNSCP with unbounded Nnnf
3.7 Example 3: Computational Complexity
In this section we investigate the effectiveness of the proposed RLL supervision in handling
computational complexity. For this we solve a problem of supervisory control with mul-
tiple marking set (which was reviewed in Example 2.2 Chapter 2) using first the off-line
approach. Next we solve the problem in an online set up using RLL policy. For this prob-
lem a random acyclic automaton is generated and assigned two different sets of marked
states. Next the automaton is used to formulate a Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Con-
trol Problem with Multiple Marking (RNSCP-MM). All plant sequences are considered
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legal (Ki = Lm(Gi)) and the objective is to ensure the nonblocking property. We obtain
the length of “N” to generate maximal permissiveness and then solve the robust control
problem for various tree expansions and report the average and maximum sizes of three
expansions.
The results are reported in Table 3.1. As we can see the proposed RLL supervisor
is a very effective approach for handling the computational complexity associated with
the RNSCP. The effectiveness becomes more pronounced when the number of states and
transitions in the plant increase. Considering the last row in Table 3.1, we observe that
the off-line problem with about 2500 states and 10000 transitions has reduced to an online
problem with an average size of 184 states and 487 transitions. Specifically, the average
state size of the online problem (i.e. tree expansion) is about %7 of the off-line problem
(i.e. plant state size).
# states # transitions Window Size
Tree expansion size
avg (states) max (states) avg (trans) max (trans)
415 1490 3 8 29 10 48
751 2865 6 61 338 128 920
1296 5461 6 73 359 174 1056
1885 7343 4 18 85 22 137
2545 10199 8 184 862 487 2985
Table 3.1: Comparison between online and off-line complexity.
Finally, we study the effect of three different parameters on the sufficient lookahead
window size.
i) Maximum distance between two states of the automaton: First, as explained before a
random acyclic automaton is generated with two plants. Next we marked %30 of the
states of each automaton. The maximum distance between two states of the automaton
was set to ND = 6,10,14,18 and 22. The size of automata was selected proportional
to ND. The results are reported in Table 3.2. The reported window size is the sample
mean of the required lookahead window over 25 experiments (rounded to the nearest
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integer). We observe that the length of sufficient lookahead window is highly corre-
lated with the maximum distance between the states of the automata.





avg (trans) max (trans)
170 634 6 3 10 59 15 119
639 1288 10 5 43 142 91 390
591 2161 14 8 137 343 411 1205
768 3005 18 10 193 399 650 1478
989 4038 22 14 310 590 1167 2352
Table 3.2: Effect of maximum distance between two states on the sufficient window size.
ii) The size of automata: A random automaton for RNSCP-MM was generated with two
sets of marked stats. We randomly marked %30 of the states of each automaton. The
maximum distance between two states of the automaton was fixed to ND = 10. The
size of the automata was increased gradually (5 times), and the required length of
lookahead windowwas determined. The results are reported inn Table 3.3. We observe
that there is no high correlation between the length of sufficient lookahead window and
the size of automaton if the maximum distance between the states remains unchanged.





avg (trans) max (trans)
369 1288 10 5 43 142 91 390
435 1748 10 4 40 134 77 349
738 2891 10 5 74 333 138 835
964 3530 10 6 111 461 304 1683
1241 4659 10 6 113 564 251 1732
Table 3.3: Effect of size of automata on the sufficient window size.
iii) The ratio of marked states: A random automaton for RNSCP-MM was generated with
two sets of marked states. The maximum distance between two states of the automa-
ton was ND = 10 and the two automata did not change during the experiment. We
randomly marked 30%,40%,60%,80% and 90% of the states of each automaton in
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five experiments. We monitored the sufficient window size. The results are reported
in Table 3.4. We observe that by increasing the percentage of marked states the re-
quired window size increases and it settles at a number (10). As an explanation, we
can say that increasing the number of marked states causes the worst case scenario
(i.e. the longest path between two consecutive nonblocking states) to be inside the
legal marked behavior.





avg (trans) max (trans)
415 1490 30% 5 58 151 135 442
415 1490 40% 7 90 256 258 914
415 1490 60% 10 134 415 367 1490
415 1490 80% 10 134 415 367 1490
415 1490 90% 10 134 415 367 1490
Table 3.4: Effect of the percentage of marked states on the sufficient window size.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, Robust Limited Lookahead (RLL) supervisor has been proposed as an ex-
tension of the conventional (non-robust) limited lookahead policy. The chapter proves that
under certain condition, the optimality of RLL supervisor can be guaranteed if the win-
dow size is sufficiently long. A case where the required window size for optimality of the
RLL supervisor becomes unbounded has been discussed. The next chapter presents the




Limited Lookahead Policy for Robust
Nonblocking Supervisory Control:
A State-based Approach
In Chapter 3 we solved Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem (RNSCP) using
an online approach called Robust Limited Lookahead (RLL) supervision. The RLL su-
pervisor is language-based and the control domain presented there is based on the strings.
Under certain condition, the optimality of RLL supervisor can be guaranteed if the window
size is sufficiently long. As we discussed at the end of Chapter 3, a sufficient length for
lookahead window of optimal RLL supervisor is not always available.
In this chapter, we study the state-based RNSCP problem (RNSCP-S) in which the
design specifications are given in terms of legal/illegal states and the supervisory map is a
state feedback control law. We will develop an RLL algorithm for RNSCP-S. Furthermore,
we provide a set of conditions under which the RLL supervisor with State information (
referred to as RLL-S supervisor) is maximally permissive.
In Section 4.1 we first discuss the requirements for control domain to be taken as states.
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Then we formulate Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem with State informa-
tion (referred to as RNSCP-S). We also show that the state-based control requirements do
not impose any limitation on RNSCP-S by presenting a procedure for conversion of any
RNSCP problem to RNSCP-S if the requirements are not met as a priori.
In Section 4.2 we present the implementation of RLL-S supervisor. Next, we discuss
the properties of RLL-S supervisor and find a set of conditions for the optimality of RLL-S
supervisor. We present an illustrative example at the end.
4.1 State-based Supervisory Control
This section is intended to set up state-based RNSCP (RNSCP-S). First, we formulate
state-based supervisory control problem and discuss its requirements. Next, we study the
conversion of any RNSCP problem to an equivalent RNSCP-S problem.
4.1.1 State-based Conventional Supervisory Control Problem
State-based supervisory control assumes (without loss of generality) that the specification
K is marked by an automaton H which is a subautomaton of the plant G. This means that
for a plant G = (Σ,X, δ, x0,Xm) the specification should be in the form of an automaton
H = (Σ,XH .δH , x0,XmH), where XH ⊆ X , XmH ⊆ Xm, δH is a restriction of δ and
K = Lm(H) [9]. If the conditions are not satisfied, [31] presents a procedure to transform
the plant and its specification appropriately so that the control domain can be taken as
states.
The goal is to design a state-feedback supervisory controller V ∶ X → 2Σ which de-
termines the set of events to be enabled at each state of the plant under supervision such
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that:
1) Lm(G,V ) ⊆ Lm(H)
2) L(G,V ) = Lm(G,V )
Note that the state set of the closed-loop system is the same as G, however, not all the
states are necessarily reachable [30].
4.1.2 State-based Robust Supervisory Control Problem
Definition 4.1. Mutually Refined Automata: Consider the two automata:
G1 = (Σ1,X1, δ1, x01,Xm1) and G2 = (Σ2,X2, δ2, x02,Xm2)
Assume that there is a one-to-one relation between a subset of X1 and X2. For simplicity,
assume the corresponding states have the same label. We say that G1 and G2 are mutually
refined if δ1(x01, s) = δ2(x02, s) for s ∈ L(G1) ∩ L(G2). Also, δ1(x01, s) ≠ δ2(x02, t) if
s ∈ L(G1) − L(G2) for all t ∈ L(G2), and δ1(x01, t) ≠ δ2(x02, s) if s ∈ L(G2) − L(G1) for
all t ∈ L(G1).
The requirement for taking the control domain of robust nonblocking supervisory con-
trol problem as states is given in [6] as follows.
Theorem 4.1. [6] If any two automata in {G1, ...,Gn,H1, ...,Hn} are mutually refined
then the control domain of robust nonblocking supervisory control problem can be taken
as states.
State-based RNSCP Problem Formulation (RNSCP-S): Suppose the model of the
system belongs to a finite set of possible models G = {G1, ...,Gn}. Each model has its own
specification which is marked by the automatonHi, i = 1, .., n whereHi is a subautomaton
of Gi. Assume any two automata in {G1, ...,Gn,H1, ...,Hn} are mutually refined so the
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control action can be taken as states. The goal is to design a state feedback law V ∶ ⋃ni Xi →
2Σ so that:
1) Lm(Gi, V ) ⊆ Lm(Hi)
2) L(Gi, V ) = Lm(Gi, V )
In this Chap we find a lookahead solution for this problem.
4.1.3 Converting RNSCP to RNSCP-S
Generally speaking, the sufficient condition in Theorem 4.1 may not be satisfied in an
RNSCP. This by no means causes a limitation to supervisory control with state information
as we can always refine the automata appropriately to satisfy the conditions.
The following definition is a generalization of biased synchronous product presented in
[31] and is required for the conversion of RNSCP to RNSCP-S.
Definition 4.2. Multiple biased synchronous product [6] Given a set of automata: R =
{R1,R2, ...,Rn} with Ri = (Xi,Σi, δi, x0i,Xmi) the multiple biased synchronous product
of Rk is defined as:
Rk ∣∣mr(R−{Rk}) ∶= Ac(X1×...×Xn,Σk, δ, (x01, ...x0n),X1×...×Xk−1×Xmk×Xk+1×Xn)
where:














δi(xi, σ) if σ ∈ ΣRi(xi)
xi if σ ∉ ΣRi(xi)
The key point is that the multiple biased production of Rk does not alter its generated
or marked languages. Thus [6] presents the following procedure for mutual refinement of
a set of plants and their specifications. It shows that the closed and marked languages of
the resulting automata remain unchanged and that any two automata are mutually refined.
Consequently, the resulting problem can be treated as a RNSCP-S.
Procedure 4.1. 1. Define the set R ∶= {G1, ...,Gn,H1, ...,Hn}. Add a dump state to
each automaton Ri and add transitions Σ − ΣRi(x) from each state x to the dump
state. Then, add self-loop Σ to the dump state. The resulting automata are denoted






2. Replace G′i in R
′ with Gi and derive G
′′
i = Gi ∣∣mr (R′ − {Gi}) for all i = 1, ..., n.
3. Replace H ′i in R
′ with Hi and derive H
′′
i =Hi ∣∣mr (R′ − {Hi}) for all i = 1, ..., n.
Example 4.1. Consider G = {G1,G2} as shown in Figure 4.1 and the corresponding spec-
ificationsK1 andK2. Initially, the control domain can not be taken as states. For example,
in G1 we observe that δ(1, abc) = δ(1, aa) considering the fact that abc is legal while aa is
illegal we understand that the control domain can not be taken as states.





0 1 2a 3b 4c 
(b)K1





0 1 2a 3b 
(d)K2
Figure 4.1: Plants and specifications before refinement
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Following the Procedure 4.1 we first add a dump state to all the generators in order to















































Figure 4.2: Modified automata: Example 4.1
Next we find the set of refined automata as G′′i = Gi ∣∣mr (R′ − {Gi}) and H ′′i =
Hi ∣∣mr (R′ − {Hi}) where i = 1,2. The set of refined automata is shown in Figure 4.3.
We can verify that the refined problem satisfies the assumption of an RNSCP-S problem.































0 1 2a 3b 4c 
(c)K1
′′
0 1 2a 3b 
(d)K2
′′
Figure 4.3: Refined automata: Example 4.1
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4.2 Robust Limited Lookahead Supervision with State In-
formation
4.2.1 Linguistic Preliminaries
Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0,Xm) and L(G) ∶= {s ∈ Σ∗ ∶ δ(x0, s) is defined}. We define [x] as the
set of all traces leading to state x from the initial state x0:
[x] = {s ∈ Σ∗ ∣ δ(x0, s) = x ∧ (/∃ t < s ∶ δ(x0, t) = x)}
Definition 4.3. Post-automaton G/[x] is the subautomaton of G which is reachable from
the state x ∈XG. L(G/[x]) denotes the language of G/[x].
L(G/[x]) ∶= {t ∈ Σ∗ ∣ s ∈ [x] ∧ δ(x0, st) ∈XG}
Obviously, L(G/[x]) = L(G/s).
Definition 4.4. Truncation ofG after [x] The truncation ofG/[x] toN is the subautomaton
of G which is reachable within N steps from x and it is denoted by G/[x]∣N .
In general we can see thatL(G/s)∣N ⊆ L(G/[x])∣N . If t ∈ L(G/[x])∣N and t ∉ L(G/s)∣N ,
then ∣t∣ > N .
Expansion as a subgraph The main difference between RLL and RLL-S supervisors
is the expansion procedure. The RLL supervisor estimates the behavior of a plant under
supervision using an N-step tree expansion. A tree is a structure which distinguishes states
based on their event history without making any assumption about the equivalence of the
states. Thus tree structure is a useful tool since it permits to compute the control action
with no need of state information, while it is also limiting because the size of state space of
a lookahead tree increases quickly with increasing the length of lookahead window [26]. It
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may also cause the length of required window for the optimality of RLL supervisor to be
unbounded.
These problems can be resolved if we replace the tree structure with a subgraph. Similar
to the RLL supervision we assume that we are given L(Gi/s∣N) and L(K/s∣N) for any
executed trace s along with the state following each event. The information is enough to
estimate the future behavior of each model as a subgraph. We should note that the size of
state space for expansion of an automaton as a subgraph is bounded by the automaton’s
number of states which is always finite in the case of finite state automata.
Example 4.2. Consider the automaton in Figure 4.4. Let the length of lookahead window





































Figure 4.5: Subgraph expansion of G: Example 4.2
Now, if we expand the plant G as a tree, the outcome would be the automaton shown
in Figure 4.6. Comparing the tree-expansion with the subgraph expansion we observe that
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(i) the language of the tree expansion is a subset of the language of the subgraph expansion























Figure 4.6: Tree expansion of G: Example 4.2
Definition 4.5. Pending State A state is pending if it is only encountered at the frontier of
L(G/s∣N). It is formally defined as:
Xpending = {x ∈XG ∣ x ∈XG/[x]∣N ∧ x ∉XG/[x]∣N−1}
In the preceding example, states 4 and 5 are designated as pending states. Taking a





















i = 1, ..., n
γN(s)
Figure 4.7: Block diagram of State-based Robust Limited Lookahead Supervisor
4.2.2 RLL-S Supervisor
In this section we discuss Robust Limited Lookahead supervisor with State information
(RLL-S). Compared with the RLL supervisor, the procedure steps remain unchanged ex-
cept the expansion procedure. Here we briefly explain how the RLL supervisor should be
modified to properly accommodate the problem of undefined required window size asso-
ciated with the RLL supervisor. Further, we briefly discuss the properties of the RLL-S
supervisor compared with the RLL supervisor. We also find a lower bound for the looka-
head window size which guarantees the optimality of the RLL-S supervisor.
Consider a problem which is formulated as RNSCP-S and thus the control domain can
be taken as states. Referring to Figure 4.7, the RLL-S supervisor is briefly described.
Similar to RLL supervisor, suppose that the process has executed the trace s ∈ [x] so far.
The online control functions in Figure 4.7 are described in the following:
1. Similar to RLL supervisor the block f sG identifies the plants which are compatible
with the currently executed trace s where s ∈ [x] and x is current state of the plant.
Without loss of generality suppose that the first n′ models are compatible with s (i.e.
Gi, i = 1, ..., n′).
2. On the basis of knowledge available about the plants, the supervisor predicts the
possible behavior (states and language) of all compatible plant models N step beyond
the current state x. It is the function of block fN
L(G)
to build subautomatonGi/[x]∣N of
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all models.
3. The supervisor then determines which states in the subautomaton of Gi/[x]∣N are





(X(Gi) −X(Hi)). Removing illegal states is to be done by the block fNK in
Figure 4.7.
4. Next we take the conservative attitude toward the pending states since they may reach
into illegal region by executing uncontrollable events. This is to be done by the block
fNa .
5. Afterwards, the block fN⇑ computes the supremal relative-closed, controllable, and
G/[x]∣N -nonblocking part of the output of block fNa with respect to the Gi/[x]∣N ,
i = 1, ...n′, and G/[x]∣N .
6. Finally, the block fNu finds the enabled events for the currently executed string s, by
restricting the output of block fN⇑ to single-event sequences.
4.2.3 Properties of RLL-S Supervisor
In this section we study some of the properties of the RLL-S supervisor. We also compare
the RLL-S with RLL supervisor.
Lemma 4.1. Let s ∈ Σ∗ and s ∈ [x]. Then:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/[x]∣N) ⊆ supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]∣N)
The proof follows the fact that K/s∣N−1 ⊆ K/[x]∣N−1. Note that we are applying the
same monotone operator on both sides of the inclusion, thus the inclusion would be pre-
served under the operation.
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∆Li = L(Gi/[x]∣N) −L(Gi/s∣N)
∆Lm,i =∆Li ∩Lm(Gi/[x]∣N)
∆L = L(G/[x]∣N) −L(G/s∣N)
∆Lm =∆L ∩Lm(G/[x]∣N)
Note that ∀t ∈∆Li → ∣t∣ ≥ N +1. Also ∀t′ ∈ RHS and LHS, then ∣t′∣ ≤ N −1. First we
prove that LHS ⊆ RHS. For this we prove that LHS is relative closed and controllable
with respect to G/[x]∣N and nonblocking with respect to Gi/[x]∣N , i = 1, ..., n′.
i) G-nonblocking: Since LHS is Gi/s∣N -nonblocking we have
LHS ∩ L(Gi/s∣N) = LHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N)
Also, LHS ∩∆Li = LHS ∩∆Lm,i = ∅. Thus:
LHS ∩Lm(Gi/[x]∣N) = LHS ∩ (Lm(Gi/s∣N) ∪∆Lm,i)
= LHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N) ∪LHS ∩∆Lm,i
= (LHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N)) ∪ (LHS ∩∆Li)
= LHS ∩L(Gi/[x]∣N)
73
ii) Controllability: By assumption, LHSΣu ∩ L(G/s∣N) ⊆ LHS. Also, ∀t ∈ LHS,
∣t∣ ⩽ N − 1. So for all t ∈ LHS and σ ∈ Σ, ∣tσ∣ ≤ N and thus LHSΣu ∩∆L = ∅.
LHSΣu ∩L(G/[x]∣N) = LHSΣu ∩ (L(G/s∣N) ∪∆L)
= (LHSΣu ∩ (L(G/s∣N)) ∪ (LHSΣu ∩∆L)
⊆ LHS
iii) Lm(G)-closure: We know thatLHS∩Lm(G/s∣N) = LHS andLHS∩∆Lm = ∅. Thus
we can easily conclude that LHS ∩ Lm(G/[x]∣N) = LHS ∩ (Lm(G/s∣N) ∪∆Lm) =
LHS.
Now we prove the other inclusion which isRHS ⊆ LHS following a similar procedure.
i) G-nonblocking: Since RHS is Gi/[x]∣N -nonblocking, we have:
RHS ∩L(Gi/[x]∣N) = RHS ∩Lm(Gi/[x]∣N)
Also RHS ∩∆Li = RHS ∩∆Lm,i = ∅. Thus:
RHS ∩Lm(Gi/s∣N) = RHS ∩ (Lm(Gi/s∣N) ∪∆Lm,i)
= RHS ∩Lm(Gi/[x]∣N)
= RHS ∩L(Gi/[x]∣N)
= RHS ∩ (L(Gi/s∣N) ∪∆Li)
= RHS ∩L(Gi/s∣N)
ii) Controllability: By assumption, RHSΣu ∩ L(G/[x]∣N) ⊆ RHS. Also, we know ∀t ∈
74
RHS, ∣t∣ ⩽ N −1. So for all t ∈ RHS and σ ∈ Σ, ∣tσ∣ ≤ N and thusRHSΣu∩∆L = ∅.
RHSΣu ∩L(G/s∣N) = RHSΣu ∩ (L(G/s∣N) ∪∆L)
= RHSΣu ∩L(G/[x]∣N)
⊆ RHS
iii) Lm(G)-closure: By assumption, RHS ∩Lm(G/[x]∣N) = RHS and RHS ∩∆Lm = ∅.
Thus we can easily conclude thatRHS∩Lm(G/s∣N) = RHS∩(Lm(G/s∣N)∪∆Lm) =
RHS ∩Lm(G/[x]∣N) = RHS.
Lemma 4.3. Let s ∈ Σ∗ and s ∈ [x]. Then:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) ⊆ supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]∣N)
Proof:
supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/s∣N) ⊆ supRCNb(K/s∣N−1,G/[x]∣N) (by Lemma 4.2)
⊆ supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]∣N) (by Lemma 4.1)
Property 4.1. It follows from Lemma 4.3 that, in general, the RLL-S supervisor is more
permissive than the RLL supervisor:
L(G,γNRLL) ⊆ L(G,γNRLL−S)
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Lemma 4.4. Let s ∈ Σ∗ and s ∈ [x]. Then:
supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]) ⊆ supRCNb(K/[x],G/[x])
Proof: The proof follows the fact that K/[x]∣N−1 ⊆K/[x].





∆Li = L(Gi/[x]) −L(Gi/[x]∣N)
∆Lm,i =∆Li ∩Lm(Gi/[x])
∆L = L(G/[x]) −L(G/[x]∣N)
∆Lm =∆L ∩Lm(G/[x])
Further, note that:
∆Lm,i ∩Lm(Gi/[x]∣N) = ∅, LHS ⊆ Lm(Gi/[x]∣N)→∆Lm,i ∩LHS = ∅
∆Li ∩L(Gi/[x]∣N) = ∅, LHS ⊆ L(G/[x]∣N)→∆Li ∩LHS = ∅
∆L ∩L(G/[x]∣N−1)Σu = ∅, LHSΣu ⊆ L(G/[x]∣N−1)Σu →∆L ∩LHSΣu = ∅
∆L ∩L(G/[x]∣N) = ∅, LHS ⊆ L(G/[x]∣N)→∆L ∩LHS = ∅→∆Lm ∩LHS = ∅
Similar statements can be driven for RHS. Having the above mentioned statements the
rest of proof follows a same procedure as the Lemma 4.2 and its removed for brevity.
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Lemma 4.6. Let s ∈ Σ∗ and s ∈ [x]. Then:
supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]∣N) ⊆ supRCNb(K/s,G/s)
Proof:
supRCNb(K/s,G/s) = supRCNb(K/[x],G/[x])) (since s ∈ [x])
⊇ supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]) (by Lemma 4.4)
= supRCNb(K/[x]∣N−1,G/[x]∣N) (by Lemma 4.5)
Property 4.2. In general the RLL and RLL-S supervisors are both legal and the behavior of
the system under supervision of these supervisors is a subset of the behavior of the system
under supervision of the optimal off-line supervisor V .
L(G,γNRLL) ⊆ L(G,γNRLL−S) ⊆ L(G, V )
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the RLL supervisor is maximally permissive L(G, γNRLL) =
L(G, V ). Then the RLL-S supervisor too would be maximally permissiveL(G, γNRLL−S) =
L(G, V ).
Proof: The proof directly follows from Property 4.2.
4.2.4 Maximally Permissive RLL-S Supervisor
In this section, we would like to find a set of sufficient conditions which guarantee that
RLL-S is maximally permissive. We assume that the problem is already converted to
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RNSCP-S form. The set of plants and their specifications is {G1, ...,Gn,H1, ...,Hn}, the
union model is G and the overall specification is characterized by the automaton H .
Definition 4.6. Given a set of plantsGi, i = 1, ..., n, the set of nonblocking states is defined
as:
Hnb ∶= {x ∈H ∣ [x] ∩Lm(Gi) = [x] ∩L(Gi) ∧ (∀σ ∈ Σu ∶ [x]σ ∉ L(G))}.
Next we define w(x, s) which contains the set of reachable states from the state x
through execution of string s, if none of these states belongs to Hnb. w(x, s) is defined for





{δ(x, t) ∶ t ≤ s} if δ(x, s) ∈XHnb ∧ (∀ < t < s) ∶ δ(x, t) ∉XHnb
∅ otherwise





Note that NB is always defined in case of finite state automata. This is not always true
for Nnnf which determines the required bound for RLL supervisor. We should also note
that if Nnnf is defined then Nnnf + 1 = NB (Because, we count the number encountered
states between two states in XH , instead of counting the events in between).
The following lemma generalizes Lemma 3.5 to the case of state-based supervisory
control. Note that for notational simplicity we use H instead of L(H).
Lemma 4.7. H ∈ RCNb(K/[y],G/[y]) and [x] ⊆ supRCNb(K,G). Suppose for [x] ⊆H:
1. [x] ∩Lm(Gi/[y]) = [x] ∩L(Gi/[y])
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2. ∀σ ∈ Σu ∶ [σ ∉ L(G/[y])]
Then H − ([x](H/[x]) − [x]) ∈ RCNb(K/[y],G/[y]).
Proof: H ′ = [x](H/[x])−[x] andH ′′ = [x](H/[x])−[x]. First, we showH −H ′ =H−H ′′.
H −H ′′ = [H −H ′ ∪H ′] − ([x]H/[x] − [x])
= [H −H ′ − ([x]H/[x] − [x])] ∪ [H ′ − ([x]H/[x] − [x])]
= H −H ′ ∪ [H ′ − ([x]H/[x] − [x])]
(H −H ′ and ([x]H/[x] − [x]) are disjoint)
= H −H ′ ∪ [[x](H/[x]) − [x] − ([x]H/[x] − [x])]
= H −H ′ ∪ [([x] ∪ [x]H/[x]) − ([x]H/[x] − [x])]
(by Lemma 2.4)
= H −H ′ ∪ [[x] ∪ ([x]H/[x] − ([x]H/[x] − [x]))]
= H −H ′ ∪ [x] ∪ [x]
= H −H ′ ∪ [x]
= H −H ′
To prove the Gi/[y] − nonblocking property, consider two different cases.
1. [x] /⊆ Lm(Gi/[y]): By Lemma 2.5 we have:
(H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[y]) = (H ∩Lm(Gi/[y])) − (H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/[y]))
Since, in this case H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/[y]) = ∅ we conclude
(H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[y]) =H ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
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Furthermore
H −H ′ ∩L(Gi/[y]) ⊆ H ∩L(Gi/[y])
= H ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
= (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
So, H −H ′ ∩ L(Gi/[y]) ⊆ (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[y]). Since the reverse containment
always holds, we have H −H ′ ∩L(Gi/[y]) = (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[y]).
2. [x] ⊆ Lm(Gi)/[y]: Therefore t ∈ L(Gi/[y]). Now, consider:
(H −H ′) ∩L(Gi/[y]) = (H − ([x]H/[x] − t)) ∩L(Gi/[y])
= (H ∩L(Gi/[y])) − (([x]H/[x] − [x]) ∩L(Gi/[y]))
= (H ∩L(Gi/[y])) −∆LL (4.1)
where ∆LL ∶= ([x]H/[x] − [x]) ∩ L(Gi/[y]). Next, let R = (H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
and consider:
H ∩Lm(Gi/[y]) = R ∪H ′ ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
= R ∪ ([x](H/[x]) − [x]) ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
= R ∪ [x](H/[x] − ) ∩Lm(Gi/[y])
= R ∪ ([x](H/[x] − ) ∩Lm(Gi/[y][x]) ∪ t)
= R ∪ [x]H/[x] ∩Lm(Gi/[y][x]) (since [x] ⊆ R)
= R ⊍ ([y]H/[x] ∩Lm(Gi/[y][x]) − [x])
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Let ∆LR = ([x]H/[x] ∩Lm(Gi/[y][x]) − [x]), then:
(H −H ′) ∩Lm(Gi/[x]) =H ∩Lm(Gi/[x]) −∆LR (4.2)
Note that:
∆LR = [x]H/[x] ∩Lm(Gi/[y][x]) − [x]
= [x]H ∩Lm(Gi/[y])/[x] − [x] (by Lemma 2.1)
= [x](H ∩L(Gi/[y]))/[x] − [x] (H is Lm(Gi/[y])-closed)
= [x](H/[x] ∩L(Gi/[y][x])) − [x] (by Lemma 2.1)
= ([x]H/[x] ∩L(Gi/[y])) − [x]
= ([x]H/[x] − [x]) ∩L(Gi/[y])
= ∆LL
From (4.1), (4.2), and Gi/[y]-nonblocking property of H it follows that H − H ′ is
Gi/[y] − nonblocking.
For controllability we need to ensure that the behavior of L(G/[y]) can be limited to
H −H ′. This goal can be simply achieved by disabling the events after the state x which
we know are all controllable. Finally, for relative-closure:
H −H ′ ∩Lm(G/[y]) = (H − ([x]H/[x] − [x])) ∩Lm(G/[y])
= (H ∩Lm(G/[y])) − (([x]H/[x] − [x]t) ∩Lm(G/[y]))
= H − (([x]H/[x] ∩Lm(G/[y])) − [x]) (H is Lm(G)-closed)
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= H − ([x](H/[x] ∩Lm(G/[y][x])) − [x]) (H/[x] ∩Lm(Gi/[y])/[x] =H/[x])
= H − ([x](H/[x]) − x)
= H −H ′
This completes the proof.
Finally the next theorem formalizes a set of sufficient conditions that guarantees the
RLL-S supervisor is maximally permissive.
Theorem 4.2. Assume H = Hnb and that there is no SE in L(G,γN). If N ≥ NB then
L(G,γNRLL−S) = supRCNb(K,G).
Proof: To prove the theoremwe start with the automatonH ∶= supRCNb(K/[x],G/[x])
and then construct H ′ with the following procedure:
• Expand H ′ as a subgraph of H .
• Stop the expansion in every state x ∈Xnb.
This is equivalent to removing all strings after a nonblocking controllable state. Accord-
ing to Lemma 4.7, the language represented byH ′ remains Gi/[x]-nonblocking, controllable
and relative-closed with respect to G/[x].
We now claim that the expansion of H ′ terminates in NB − 1 steps. Since H = Hnb we
conclude that all states in H are coreachable with respect to states in Hnb. If this was not
the case then the condition H = Hnb would be violated. The distance between every state
and a nonblocking state x ∈ Hnb is bounded by NB − 1 and we know that the expansion
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terminates in all branches. Consequently, this termination happens the worst case inNB −1
steps. This means that:
H ′ =H ′/[x] =H ′/[x]∣NB−1 =H ′/[x]∣N−1 ⊆K/[x]
Next we show that
L(H ′∣1) = L(H ∣1)
Obviously, L(H ′∣1) ⊆ L(H ∣1) so we only need to show the reverse containment. Sup-
pose t ∈ L(H ∣1) and therefore ∣t∣ = 1. Also let δ(t, x) = x′ where x′ ∈ XH . If x′ is a
nonblocking controllable state, then t ∈ L(H ′) and consequently L(H ′∣1) = L(H ∣1). If x′
is not a nonblocking controllable state then there exists a t′ such that δ(x′, t′) = x′′ such that
x′′ is nonblocking controllable. Again this means t ∈ L(H ′) and thus L(H ′∣1) = L(H ∣1).
Finally similar to Lemma 4.2 we can show that:
H ′ = supRCNb(H ′,G/[x]) (by Lemma 4.7)
= supRCNb(H ′,G/[x]∣N) (Proof similar to Lemma 4.2)
Remark 4.1. Let E = supRCNb(K,G). The condition H = Hnb can be replaced by E =
Enb as we only remove the post-language of nonblocking states in supRCNb(K[x],G/[x]).




In this section we present a simple example in order to clarify the presented results.
Example 4.3. Consider two mutually refined automata G = {G1,G2} as shown in Figure
4.8 with Σc = {a, b, c}, Σuc = {d, e}, and the illegal states 3, 10. The marked states in













































Figure 4.8: Example 4.3: Plant automata.
In the following we first determine the off-line solution to the problem.
4.3.1 Off-line Solution
First we consider the union model of the plant which is equal to G2 in this problem (G =
G2). The overall specification,H , is obtained by removing illegal states and all the attached





















Figure 4.9: Example 4.3: The overall specification H .
We then solve the problem based on the algorithm presented in [23] to find supRCNb(K,G).
For this purpose we use the MATLAB function supRCN which is listed in Appendix B.

















Figure 4.10: Example 4.3: Realization of off-line state-based supervisor.
Next we work out to find the online solution to the problem.
4.3.2 Online Solution
The focus of this example is on finding the maximally permissive RLL-S supervisor. With
this purpose, we first determine NB.
Length of Lookahead Window
To determineNB we have to determineHnb andw(x, s) for every x ∈XH and s ∈ L(H)/[x].





















Figure 4.11: Hnb: Example 4.3
Next, we form w(x, s) for all x ∈XH and s ∈ L(H)/[x] that w(x, s) is nonempty.
w(1, a) = {1,2}
w(2, ba) = {2,5,6}, w(2, bb) = {2,6,7}, w(2, bd) = {2,6,11}
w(5, b) = {1,5}, w(5, ab) = {5,6,7}, w(5, ad) = {5,6,11}
w(6, b) = {6,7}, w(6, a) = {5,6}, w(6, d) = {6,11}
w(7, b) = {7,8}, w(7, aa) = {5,6,7}, w(6, d) = {6,11}
w(11, be) = {11,12}
Having the setsw(x, s)we findNB = 3which is the required window size for optimality
of RLL-S supervisor.
Control Action Computation
According to Theorem 4.2 and Remark 4.1 we expect L(G,γ3) to be maximally permis-
sive. We investigate the performance of the supervisor along the path abb. Starting from
s = , both models are compatible with the currently executed trace; the output of fN⇑ block





Figure 4.12: fN(): Example 4.3
So, the control action is γ3() = {a}. After executing event a, with s = a and x = 2, the
control action is γ3(a) = {a, b}, and the output of block fN⇑ is as Figure 4.13. One can see
that executing further events, and going ahead through the lookahead window causes new














Figure 4.13: fN(a): Example 4.3
Continuing with execution of the events the next control action would be γ3(ab) =
{a, b, d}. This shows that by choosing the window size long enough, we can achieve
L(G,γN) = supRCNb(K,G).
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the state-based RNSCP problem in which the specifications are in terms
of legal/illegal states and the supervisor is a state feedback control law has been studied.
State-based RLL (RLL-S) supervisor has been proposed as a dual of the linguistic approach
presented in Chapter 3. Furthermore, a set of conditions under which the RLL-S supervisor
is maximally permissive has been provided. In the next chapter, the proposed online RLL-S




Robustness of a spacecraft is an important criterion due to the long time operation of the
spacecraft with no maintenance in between. It is essential to take a robust, fault-tolerant
control strategy in case of designing an autonomous spacecraft. In this section we consider
the propulsion systems of two spacecraft: Viking and Cassini. The systems studied here
are subject to some simplifications.
Spacecraft are subject to numerous failures, which means that off-line supervisor re-
quires a large amount of memory for implementation onboard. We apply the proposed
online RLL-S supervision for robust control of the spacecraft propulsion systems.
5.1 Viking Spacecraft
The simplified propulsion system of Viking orbiter is depicted in Figure 5.1 [35]. It consists
of a high pressure Helium tank, a pyro-ladder consisting five pyro-valves (PV 1, PV 3, PV 5
are normally closed; PV 2 and PV 4 are normalcy open), a regulator valve to pressurize fuel
tanks, and an engine usable for trajectory correction and orbiter insertion maneuvers. The
pyro-valves can operate only once, meaning that if a normally-closed (resp. normally-
open) turns open (resp. turned close), it remains open (resp. closed) for the rest of mission
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and the action is not reversible. In Figure 5.1, the pyro-valves in solid black are normally



















Figure 5.1: Simplified pressure control assembly of Viking orbiter.
As Viking 1 was approaching to the Mars, a major anomaly was detected in its pressure
control assembly. On June 7, 1976, PV 3 was opened to pressurize the fuel tanks for the
Approach Course Manoeuver (ACM). However, the tanks pressure continued to rise after
the regulator threshold was reached due to regulator leakage. The obvious solution was to
fire PV2 in order to cut-off the pressure from the regulator. This would leave PV 1 as the
only path for pressurizing the tanks prior to Mars Orbit Insertion (MOI). If PV1 failed to
open (get stock closed), the whole mission would be lost because of low fuel pressure [37].
The adopted solution, which was uplinked to the spacecraft from ground station, was to
split ACM into two parts. Thus they could keep the tanks’ pressures below rapture pressure
during the 12 days remaining to MOI. Such decisions cannot be made autonomously and
they must be made by human operators.
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The Viking’s design did not have enough redundancy for onboard autonomous deci-
sions. The design was later modified in Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) spacecraft [35] ,[40].
The schematic diagram of MGS propulsion system is shown in Figure A.1. A simplified





















Figure 5.2: Simplified MGS propulsion system
The new design has enough redundancy for single-failure scenarios. In this section
we aim to design a supervisor which handles the the same situation happened for Viking
spacecraft. This means that at the start of the ACM, PV3, PV4 and PV5 are already fired,
V1 is open, and the regulator is leaking. In the next section, we find the DES model of the
system.
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5.1.1 Discrete Event Modeling
In this section we present DES model of different components and the interactions between
them. Then we construct the complete model of the system by combining the components
and interactions. Table 5.1 describes all the events which appears in the modeling. For
simplicity we assume that only V1 and PV1 are subject to failure.
Event Tag Description
101 V1,OC Valve 1 open command (controllable)
100 V1,SC Valve 1 fails stuck-closed (uncontrollable)
110 V1,O Valve 1 opens (uncontrollable)
201 V1,CC Valve 1 close command (controllable)
200 V1,SO Valve 1 fails stuck-open (uncontrollable)
210 V1,C Valve 1 closes (uncontrollable)
10 PV1,OC Pyro-valve 1 open command (controllable)
11 PV1,O Pyro-valve 1 opens (uncontrollable)
12 PV1,SC Pyro-valve 1 fails stuck-closed (uncontrollable)
i1 PVi,OC Pyro-valve i open command, i = 3,5,7 (controllable)
i2 PVi,O Pyro-valve i opens, i = 3,5,7 (uncontrollable)
i0 PVi,CC Pyro-valve i close command, i = 2,4,6 (controllable)
i1 PVi,C Pyro-valve i closes, i = 2,4,6 (uncontrollable)
1000 P1,L P1 goes down (uncontrollable)
1001 P1,H P1 goes high (uncontrollable)
Table 5.1: Event list for Viking propulsion system
The DES models for normal and normal-faulty modes of V1 are shown in the following
following figure.
The valve is prone to two different failures (stuck-open and stuck-closed). Thus, we
would have two different normal-faulty models as depicted in Figure 5.3.
The next model is for the pyro-valves. For simplicity, we assume that only PV1 is
subject to failure. Once PV1 is commanded open, it may turn-on or it may get stuck-
closed. If the valve becomes stuck, there is still a chance of operation by issuing more
open commands. This means that PV1 has three possible DES models: 1- the normal
model with no failure event 2- normal-faulty model, where the valve fails stuck-closed and































101: V1 open command
100: V1 fails stuck-closed
110: V1 opens
201: V1 close command
200: V1 fails stuck open
210: V1 closes 
(c) V 1NF2
Figure 5.3: DES models of isolation valve V1
where the valve fails after issuing the first command but it turns-on after issuing more open


























Figure 5.4: DES models of pyro-valve PV1
Remark 5.1. In order to conform to the state-domain control requirements normal and
normal-faulty models of every components need to be mutually refined. Thus, the DES



























Figure 5.5: DES models of pyro-valve PV1
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i0: open PVi command
i1: PVi opens
For i=2,4,6
i0: close PVi command
i1: PVi closes
Figure 5.6: PVi: DES model of pyro-valve i = 2,3, ..,7
Finally, we need the DES model of pressure sensor P1 as shown in Figure 5.7. Note
that the pressure is initially high.
1000: P goes down




Figure 5.7: P1: DES model of pressure sensor
Now that we have the DES models of the components, the next step is to model the
interaction between them. In this example, pressure P1 depends on the state of the valves.
Pressure P1 is high if and only if:
• PV1 AND PV7 are open,
• OR PV1 AND V1 AND PV6 are open,
• OR PV2 AND PV7 are open,
• OR PV2 AND V1 AND PV6 are open,
This can be described as a DES model obtained from sync operation of sync(V1, PV1,
PV2, PV6, PV7) and then adding self-loops of appropriate pressure events to each state.
The obtained DES has 6×4×33 = 648 states. We refer to the DES model of the interactions
as INT.
Lastly, we should determine the set of marked states in our model. We would like to
bring down the pressure P1 (in the upstream of the regulator), so we prevent the regulator
93
from leaking (this keeps tank pressures below the rapture pressure). Then we have to bring
up the pressure P1 and keep it high in order to pressurize the tanks for MOI maneuver. Thus
the following automaton presents the set marked strings in this problem. To determine the
appropriate marking, it would be enough to sync the automaton with DES model of the









1000: P1 goes down
1001: P1 goes high 
Figure 5.8: M : DES model of the appropriate marking
Considering a single-failure scenario the set of possible models for RNSCP will be as
follows. The pair of (# states,# transitions) is shown for each model. The union model has
2592 states and 11394 transitions.
GN = sync(V 1N , PV 1N , PV2, ..., PV7, P, INT,M) (1296, 6556)
GNF1 = sync(V 1N , PV 1NF1 , PV2, PV6, PV7, P, INT,M) (1728, 7596)
GNF1R = sync(V 1N , PV 1NF1R, PV2, PV6, PV7, P, INT,M) (1728, 8028)
GNF2 = sync(V 1NF1 , PV 1N , PV2, PV6, PV7, P, INT,M) (1944, 9834)
GNF3 = sync(V 1NF2 , PV 1N , PV2, PV6, PV7, P, INT,M) (1944, 9834)
5.1.2 Design Specification
The design specification does not identify any certain state as illegal in the plant model.
Thus, the main objective is to ensure that the system under supervision is nonblocking.
The set of marked states includes the states that reach after bringing the pressure P1 down
and then bringing and keeping it up again. This corresponds to completion of the task.
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5.1.3 Robust Formulation of the Problem
As described in Chapter 1, fault recovery problem can modeled as a RNSCP. In fault recov-
ery problem, we aim to design a robust supervisor which guarantees that the system under
supervision meets the safety requirements and it is nonblocking in both normal and failure
modes.
If we apply conventional (non-robust) supervisory control to this problem, pyro-valve
PV2 will be allowed to close in order to bring down the pressure P1 and stop regulator
leakage. However, if PV1 fails to open, then the system under supervision of non-robust
supervisor may reach a deadlock; since the recovery event in PV1 is not forcible. As a result
of the failure of PV1 failure P1 can not rise anymore and a deadlock happens in the failure
mode. This show that non-robust supervisory control is not able to meet nonblocking
requirement and thus, the problem must be formulated in the robust control framework.
Problem formulation: Let G = {GN ,GNF1 , ...,GNF4} be the set of normal and normal-
failure models of MGS propulsion system. Gunion = ⋃Gi with Gi ∈ G. Assuming that
all the states are legal, the overall specification is K = Lm(Gunion). Design a maxi-
mally permissive nonblocking state-based supervisor such that L(GN , γ) = Lm(GN , γ)
and L(GNFi , γ) = Lm(GNFi , γ) for i = 1, ...,3 and L(GNF1R, γ) = Lm(GNF1R, γ). Note
that the plant models are mutually refined. ∎
5.1.4 Off-line Solution
In this section, we summarize the procedure for the computation of off-line robust supervi-
sor. The process which is presented here is developed in MATLAB environment using the
DECK toolbox [43]. The implemented procedures are presented in Appendix B.
1. After building DES model of every component, the problem is setup by constructing
the set of possible models G = {GN ,GNF1 , ...,GNF3}. The overall specificationK is
set equal to the union plant model since there is no illegal state.
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2. Using the procedureE = supRCN(K,Gunion,Σu,GN ,GNF1 , ...,GNF3), we find the
supremal relative-closed, controllable Gi-nonblocking part of K.
3. The off-line supervisor is characterized by the closed-behavior of the automaton E.
The resulting off-line supervisor has 763 states and 2361 transitions.
We use off-line solution to validate maximal permissiveness of the corresponding RLL-
S supervisor.
5.1.5 Online Solution
In order to design a maximally permissive RLL-S supervisor we have to (i) First, determine
NB which is the required length of lookahead window and (ii) verify the condition of
Theorem 4.2 and Remark 4.1. Here we present the functions which are developed for
solving the online problem.
• In the first step, we determine Hnb as defined in Chapter 4. This is to be done us-
ing the function detKnb(H,Σu,GN ,GNF1 , ...,GNF4). The function examines every
marked controllable state in H to determine the set of nonblocking states.
• Next, the output of detKnb(Hnb,Σu) is used to determine NB through detNSB func-
tion. detNSB determines the maximum distance between every two neighboring non-
blocking states (two states which are nonblocking and are connected through a se-
quence of events. The event sequence does not go through any nonblocking states in
between). In this example NB is determined to be 10.
• Next, the maximum distance between every two states of Gunion is determined. This
is accomplished using expandLLSB(Gunion, S,N ) function. The function expands
Gunion (as a subgraph) from every state S and for various lengths of lookahead win-
dow, N . The maximum of required length for discovering the farthest state is equal
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to Nmax. Comparing NB with Nmax is an indication of the effectiveness of online
supervision. In this example Nmax = 21.
• Having the set of nonblocking states, we verify the condition in Remark 4.1. In other
words, we verify that every state in the off-line supervisor coreachable with respect
to a nonblocking state.
• Finally, we simulate the plant under supervision of RLL-S supervisor (γ10) using
RLL(Gunion,K,Σu,NB,GN ,GNF1 , ...,GNF4) function. The function prompts a set
of enabled events after execution of each event and asks the user to select the next
event in the sequence.
To study the performance of the designed RLL-S supervisor, we monitor the set of
enabled events by the supervisor along two sample paths. Each path contains a different
failure for two different single-failure scenarios.
Path 1:
The first selected path is the event sequence S1 = 201 − 200 − 60 − 61 − 1000 − 70 − 71 −
1001 which contains the failure V1 stuck open. The enabled/disabled events by the RLL-S
supervisor, γ10, is shown in Figure 5.9. In each step, the enabled events are shown by solid
line while disabled events are shown using dashed line. We observe the RLL-S supervisor
disables the events 20 and 70 in the normal mode. The events are later enabled when V1
gets stuck open.
Path 2:
The second selected path is the event sequence S2 = 201−210−1000−10−12−11−70−71
which contains the failure PV1 stuck closed. The enabled/disabled events by the RLL-S
supervisor, γ10, is shown in Figure 5.10. We observe the RLL-S supervisor disables the
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event 20 in the normal mode. This means that the supervisor prevents does not allow PV2
to get closed as there is a risk of failure in PV1.
Finally, we investigate the size of the expansions which are encountered during online
supervision. With this purpose, we construct subgraph expansions of the union model and
the overall specification, starting from every state. The obtained information is shown in
Table 5.2. We observe that the online supervisor is capable of reducing computational
complexity associated with off-line supervision. Specifically, the off-line problem with
3240 states and 14364 transitions has been reduced to an online problem with an average
size 200 states and 700 transitions.
Table 5.2: Average sizes of expanded automata
Automata # states # transitions
# states in expansions # transitions in expansions
min avg max min avg max
G 3240 14634 1 200 2070 0 700 8282






























































  101: Valve 1 open command  
  100: Valve 1 fails stuck-closed 
  110: Valve 1 opens 
  201: Valve 1 close command
  200: Valve 1 fails stuck-open
  210: Valve 1 closes
  10: Pyro-valve 1 open command 
  11: Pyro-valve 1 opens
  12: Pyro-valve 1 fails stuck-closed
  i1: Pyro-valve i open command, i=3,5,7
  i2: Pyro-valve i opens, i=3,5,7 
  i0: Pyro-valve i close command, i=2,4,6
  i1: Pyro-valve i closes, i=2,4,6
  
  1000: goes down
  1001: P1 goes high 















































































  101: Valve 1 open command  
  100: Valve 1 fails stuck-closed 
  110: Valve 1 opens 
  201: Valve 1 close command
  200: Valve 1 fails stuck-open
  210: Valve 1 closes
  10: Pyro-valve 1 open command 
  11: Pyro-valve 1 opens
  12: Pyro-valve 1 fails stuck-closed
  i1: Pyro-valve i open command, i=3,5,7
  i2: Pyro-valve i opens, i=3,5,7 
  i0: Pyro-valve i close command, i=2,4,6
  i1: Pyro-valve i closes, i=2,4,6
  
  1000: goes down
  1001: P1 goes high 
Figure 5.10: Events enabled by γ10 along S2: Viking spacecraft
5.2 Cassini Spacecraft
In this example, we consider a simplified version of the propulsion system of Cassini space-
craft propulsion system. The Cassini spacecraft is equipped with a bipropellant propulsion
system with a high number of redundant parts. Figure A.2 shows a P&ID map of the
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Figure 5.11: Cassini Main Propulsion System. [33]
Referring to Figure A.2, CMPS consists of two major subsystems (i) Pressure Control
Assembly (PCA) which controls the pressure in propellant tanks (ensuring that the pressure
remains in the normal range) and (ii) Pressure Isolation Assembly (PIA) which isolates the
tanks pressures from the engines. In this example we consider the design of a supervisor
for the PIA, assuming that the tanks have enough pressure to provide fuel to the engines





Figure 5.12: Cassini Pressure Isolation Assembly. [34]
For simplicity, we do not consider the coordination between the assemblies of the fuel
and oxidizer and reduce the model to a mono-propellant propulsion system. The schematic
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diagram of the system studied here is shown in Figure 5.13. It consists of a fuel tank, two








Figure 5.13: Simplified CMPS
The normal operation of the plant is as follows: initially the pyro-valves PV1, PV2 and
PV4 are closed. The pyro-valve PV3 is normally open. The regular valves can be opened
or closed in normal operation. The safety requirement is to avoid increasing the pressures
P1 and P2 simultaneously as we never want to fire both engines together. Furthermore, we
want to be able to switch between the engines if it is required. This means that we must be
able to increase P1 while decreasing P2 and vice versa. Thus, the problem in normal mode
is an RNSCP with Multiple set of Marked states (RNSCP-MM) [6].
The failure event f1 (resp. f2) is defined as the regular valve V1 (resp. V2) get stuck in
closed position. In this failure recovery mode, the goal is to keep the pressure P2 (resp. P1)
high while reducing P1 (resp. P2) to zero. This means that we want the engine in healthy
side E2 (resp. E1) to be fully functional. The failure events and pressure sensor events are
uncontrollable. Note that the events associated with pyro-valves are not reversible. Being
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an expensive spacecraft, CMPS has sufficient redundancy in the mission operation to stand
multiple failures. However, we only consider single fault scenarios for simplicity. (It is
worth mentioning that CMPS is still fully functional after 16 years of operation.)
5.2.1 Discrete Event Modeling
This section presents the DES models of the components and the interactions between
them. The dynamics of the components are presented based on [35], [36], [38]. Table 5.3
describes the events which appearing in the models.
Event Tag Description
i0 ViC Valve i closes, i = 1,2 (controllable)
i1 ViO Valve i opens, i = 1,2 (controllable)
i3 ViSC Valve i fails stuck close, i = 1,2 (uncontrollable)
i11 PViF Pyro-valve i fires, i = 1,2,3,4 (controllable)
i00 PiL Pressure i goes low, i = 1,2 (uncontrollable)
i01 PiH Pressure i goes high, i = 1,2 (uncontrollable)
Table 5.3: Event list for CMPS
The DES model for the regular valves are shown in the following figure. The valves are
prone to failure in closed position. The failure events are assumed permanent and thus the







i0: Valve i closes
i1: Valve i opens
i3: Valve i fails
Figure 5.14: V iNF : Regular Valve (Normal-faulty mode)




(a) Normally open pyro-valve
0 C O
i11
  i11: Pyro-valve i fires
(b) Normally closed pyro-valve
Figure 5.15: PVi: Pyro-Valves
Next, we model the sensor readings as a DES. The two different objectives on the












100 100: P1 goes low
101: P1 goes high
200: P2 goes low
201: P2 goes high













100: P1 goes low
101: P1 goes high
200: P2 goes low
201: P2 goes high
(b) PM2 : P1: low, P2: high
Figure 5.16: Sensor reading with multiple set of marked states
Finally, we model the interaction the between state of the valves and the sensor read-
ings. Pressure P1 (resp. P2) is high if and only if PV3 (resp. PV4) is open AND at least one
of the PV1 (resp. PV2) OR V1 (resp. V2) is open. This can be described as the DES models
which are shown in the Figure 5.17. The models have been obtained by adding self-loops
















































10: Valve 1 closes
11: Valve 1 opens
13: Valve 1 fails stuck close
111: Pyro-valve 1 opens
311: Pyro-valve 3 closes
100: P1 goes low
101: P1 goes high















































20: Valve 2 closes
21: Valve 2 opens
23: Valve 2 fails stuck close
211: Pyro-valve 2 opens
411: Pyro-valve 4 closes
200: P1 goes low
201: P1 goes high
(b) INT2NF : Interaction between P2 and sync(V2, PV2, PV4) (Normal-faulty mode)
Figure 5.17: Interaction between pressures and valves status
We use DECK [43] to compute the possible plant models. In this problem, the set of
possible models G contains two normal models (with different sets of marked states) and
two normal-failure models. The models are:
G{N,1} = sync(V 1N , V 2N , PV1, PV2, PV3, PV4, PM1 , INT1N , INT2N)
G{N,2} = sync(V 1N , V 2N , PV1, PV2, PV3, PV4, PM2 , INT1N , INT2N)
G{NF,1} = sync(V 1NF , V 2N , PV1, PV2, PV3, PV4, PM2 , INT1N , INT2N)
G{NF,2} = sync(V 1N , V 2NF , PV1, PV2, PV3, PV4, PM1 , INT1N , INT2N)
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where normal models (V 1N , V 2N , INT1N and INT2N ) are obtained by removing
the failure events from the DES model of components. G{N,1} and G{N,2} (the two normal
models) contain 192 states and 896 transitions. G{NF,1} andG{NF,2} (the two normal-faulty
models) contain 288 states and 1344 transitions. The marked states for G{N,1} and G{NF,2}
(respectively G{N,2} and G{NF,1}) are states where P1 is high and P2 is low (respectively
P2 is high and P1 is low).
5.2.2 Design Specification
The safety specification is that P1 and P2 should not be high at the same time at it is
a common specification for all the four plants. In addition, the closed-loop behavior
should be nonblocking for both normal models (G{N,1},G{N,2}) and normal-faulty mod-









Σ −{ , }200 101
Σ −{ , }200 101
Σ −{ , }200 101
100: P1 goes low
101: P1 goes high
200: P2 goes low
201: P2 goes high
Figure 5.18: SPEC: Overall specification automaton
The specifications Ki are then obtained by finding the intersection of the language by






Having plant models Gis and Kis, we can find the overall specification by Equation
3.1. The specificationK has 348 states and 1594 transitions.
In order to formulate the problem as RNSCP-S we have to form the specifications Kis
as a subautomaton ofGis. This can be accomplished by removing illegal states, where both
of the pressures are high, from Gis. Therefore, the specification can be in terms of illegal
states where both pressures are high. We consider a few scenarios of executed events in
order to examine the validity of the RLL-S supervision.
5.2.3 Offline Supervisor
As described in [6] and [23] both multiple marking and fault recovery problems can be
treated as special cases of robust supervision. Our example is a combination of both mul-
tiple marking and fault recovery problems. The supervisor should satisfy the safety re-
quirement while ensuring that (1) we can achieve two different goals in normal mode (2)
the system is nonblocking in both normal and faulty modes. Having the specification Kis
as a subautomaton of Gis and considering the fact that the fault recovery problem can be
considered with state set as the control domain [6], we model our problem as an RNSCP-S.
The procedures presented here are developed in MATLAB environment using Discrete
Event Control Kit (DECK) [43] and are presented in Appendix B.
1. The problem is first initialized by buildingG{N,1}, G{N,2}, G{NF,1}, G{NF,2} and also
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the specifications K{N,1}, K{N,2}, K{NF,1}, K{NF,2} by removing illegal states from
the plant models.
2. Next, the procedure E = supRCN(K,G,Σu,G1, ...,G4) applies supremal relative-
closed, supremal controllable and supremalGi-nonblocking operators iteratively un-
til it finds the fixed point of Ω defined by Ω(Z) = supRG(supNG(supCG(Z))) [21].
3. The offline supervisor is obtained by marking all the states of the automaton E
from the previous step. The procedures isNonblocking, isRelativeClosed and
controllable are used to verify that the system under supervision of the offline su-
pervisor is nonblocking and admissible.
The resulting supervisor has 181 states and 647 transitions. We used the off-line super-
visor in order to confirm that the RLL-S is valid and maximally permissive.
5.2.4 Online Solution
Next we consider the CMPS under supervision of the RLL-S supervisor. Unlike the Viking
problem, the conditions of Theorem 4.2 and/or Remark 4.1 do not hold for CMPS. How-
ever, we would like to show that the problem is still solvable using the online approach,
noting that the conditions in 4.2 are sufficient but not necessary. Here, we present an expla-
nation of why the conditions in Theorem 4.2 do not hold for CMPS problem: In modeling
of CMPS components we assumed that the failure events (which are uncontrollable) may
occur at any time while the system is operating. This is not the case for the Viking problem.
In the Viking problem, a failure may happen only after issuing a controllable command (e.g.
commanding a valve to open/close). Thus, there are a few nonblocking (controllable) states
in CMPS problem, as a failure may happen in most of the states.
Although the sufficient conditions do not hold for the CMPS problem, the problem
is still solvable using the online approach. Starting from a lookahead window size of 2
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and increasing it step-by-step we found a minimum required window length for maximal
permissiveness of RLL-S supervisor. We verified the maximally permissiveness of RLL-S
supervisor by comparing the enabled events in every states with off-line supervisor. The
required window length is determined to be 8.
The procedures which are developed for implementation of RLL-S supervisor were
previously explained and are the same as those of the Viking problem.
To observe the maximally permissiveness of RLL-S supervisor, we monitor the enabled
events along two different sample paths. The sample path s1 = V1O-P1H-V2O-V1C-P1L-V1SC
is a sequence which contains the failure of valve V1. We also consider another sample path
s2 = PV4F -V2O-P2H-V2C-V2SC-P2L which contains the failure of valve V2.
By observing the enabled events along the path S1 and comparing it with the behavior
of the off-line supervisor, we can confirm the maximal permissiveness of the RLL-S su-
pervisor. We can also observe that the RLL-S supervisor disables events PV1F , PV2F and
PV3F prior to occurrence of the failure. These events are later enabled for fault recovery
mode. The automaton representing the set of enabled events in each step is represented in
Figure 5.19.
Next we consider the enabled events along the executed path S2. Like the previous
scenario we can confirm maximally permissiveness of RLL-S supervisor by comparing it
with the off-line solution. Observe that V1C and V2C are the only enabled events if both V1
and V2 are open. This happens because we assumed that the valves are fault free while they
are open.
Lastly, we study the size of the automata which are used for online calculations (i.e. the
number of states and transitions for K and G). This can be an indiction of computational


































































































  i0: Valve i closes, i=1,2
  i1: Valve i opens, i=1,2
  i3: Valve i fails stuck close, i=1,2
  i11: Pyro-valve i fires, i=1,2,3,4 
  i00: Pressure i goes low, i=1,2
  i01: Pressure i goes high, i=1,2




















































































  i0: Valve i closes, i=1,2
  i1: Valve i opens, i=1,2
  i3: Valve i fails stuck close, i=1,2
  i11: Pyro-valve i fires, i=1,2,3,4 
  i00: Pressure i goes low, i=1,2
  i01: Pressure i goes high, i=1,2
Figure 5.20: Enabled events by RLL-S supervisor along the path S2
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Table 5.4: Average sizes of expanded automata
Automata # states # transitions
# states in expansions # transitions in expansions
min avg max min avg max
G 348 1597 2 54 289 2 190 1184
K 292 1294 2 47 242 2 161 938
We observe that the online supervisor is capable of reducing computational complexity
associated with off-line supervision. Specifically, the off-line problemwith about 348 states
and 1597 transitions has been reduced to an online problem with an average size 54 states
and 190 transitions. We observe that at each state we can calculate the control action by
looking at about %12 of the transitions and %15 of the states (on average) of the original
plant and specification.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, the proposed online RLL-S supervisor has been applied to robust supervi-
sion of the simplified versions of propulsion systems of Viking and Cassini spacecraft. The
effectiveness of the RLL-S supervisor in reducing complexity associated with the compu-





In this thesis we study the problem of robust nonblocking supervisory control of discrete
event systems. We develop limited lookahead policies as an extension of previous work
in literature [7]. The supervisor developed under this policy is named Robust Limited
Lookahead (RLL) supervisor. We study the properties of RLL supervisor and obtain a set
of sufficient conditions for maximal permissiveness of the supervision.
The RLL supervisor reduces the computational complexity of off-line supervisor as it
only looks at the behavior of the system in the currently executed trace and over a limited
horizon in the future. However, RLL supervisor may cause the behavior of the system to be
more restrictive compared with the off-line maximally permissive supervisor. This happens
if the length of lookahead widow is not large enough or the required length of window size
is undefined.
In order to overcome this challenge, we formulate RNSCP with State information
(RNSCP-S). Then RLL-S supervisor is proposed to solve the problem. In contrast with
RLL supervisor, the required window size is always defined for RLL-S supervisor if the
system is modeled with finite state automata.
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Finally, we apply RLL-S supervision algorithm to simplified versions of Viking and
Cassini main propulsion systems. The system is subject to failure and requires multiple
set of marked states. This means that the problem should be formulated as a RNSCP.
The procedures for solving the problem are developed in MATLAB environment based on
Discrete Event Control Kit (DECK).
6.2 Future Work
In this thesis we assumed full observability of the system under supervision. Future re-
search may include the extension of our results to the problem of robust nonblocking su-
pervisory control under partial observation.
The implementation of the proposed algorithms can be optimized in term of computa-
tional complexity. For instance, if we setup a recursive algorithm, then it will be possible to
use some of the information obtained in each step for the next step. Also the algorithm for
the computation of supremal relative-closed, controllable, Gi−nonblocking sublanguage is
computationally complex and should be optimized.
Two other lookahead policies are presented in literature for conventional supervisory
control (1) optimistic policy, which assumes that all the pending traces are legal and marked,
and (2) extension-based policy, which assumes that the behavior of the plant can be any-
thing in Σ∗ after a pending trace. These two policies can be generalized to the robust case.
The required length of lookahead window, “N” for optimal supervisor can be obtained
while adopting different policies. A good discussion is to compare “N” in different cases.
Variable Lookahead Policy (VLP) is also studied in literature for conventional supervi-
sory control. VLP can also be applied to RNSCP. Finally, RLL supervision can be adopted
in order to handel Timed Discrete Event Systems (TDES).
Only sufficient conditions are presented in this thesis and in the literature for optimality
of online supervisors. Future research may include studying of the existence of necessary
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conditions for the optimality of online supervision. As we observed in the Cassini problem,
the sufficient conditions may be restrict in some problem. Another suggestion is to develop
an efficient algorithm to determine the minimum length of lookahead window (if exists) by
comparing online supervisor with the predetermined off-line solution.
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Spacecraft Propulsion System Diagrams
Figure A.1: Mars Global Surveyor [35].
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 Figure A.2: Cassini Spacecraft Propulsion System [39].
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Appendix B
Discrete Event Control Kit (DECK)
DECK is a toolbox written in MATLAB for the analysis and supervisory control of discrete
event systems and it is equipped with the following functions [43], [44].
• Automaton: Creates an automaton model (automaton object) for use by DECK.
• Automatonchk: Verifies the validity of an automaton object.
• Complement: Returns complement of a deterministic automaton.
• Controllable: Determines if a language is controllable.
• Product: returns product of automata.
• Reach: Finds the reachable states of transition graph.
• Reachable: Finds reachable subautomaton.
• Selfloop: Adds selfoops to automaton.
• Supcon: Finds supremal controllable sublanguage.
• Sync: Returns synchronous product of automata.




This appendix complies the set of routines developed in the course of this thesis in the
following four sections: (i) functions for manipulation of automata (ii) off-line control (iii)
online control and (iv) examples.
C.1 Manipulation of automata
selfloopState: Adds selfloop to a specific state of an automaton.
1 function Gs=selfloopState(G,S,Es)
2 % SELFLOOPSTATE Adds selfloops to state S of automaton G
3 %
4 % SYNTAX: Gs=selfloopState(G,S,Es)
5 %
6 % INPUTS: G Input automaton
7 % S A state of input automaton
8 % Es List of events (vector)
9 %
10 % OUTPUTS: Gs Output automaton
11 %


















































Closure: finds prefix closure of an automaton
1 function Gc=closure(G)
2
3 % CLOSURE CLOSURE of an automaton
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: Gco=complement(G)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: G Input automaton
8 %
9 % OUTPUTS: Gco Output deterministic automaton
10 %





Gunion: finds union of two automata
1 function G=Gunion(G1,G2)
2
3 % Gunion Union of two automata
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: G=Gunion(G1G2)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: Gi Input automaton i (i=1,2)
8 %















isIncluded: tests if Lm(G1) ⊆ Lm(G2)
1 function E=isIncluded(G1,G2)
2
3 % ISINCLUDED Checks if Lm(G1) \subset Lm(G2)
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: E=isIncluded(G1,G2)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: G1,G2 Input automatons
8 %























isNonblocking: tests if an automaton is G-nonblocking
1 function b=isNonblocking(K,varargin)
2
3 % ISNONBLOCKING Checks if for all Gi, i=1,...,n
4 % pr(K) [INTERSEC] L(Gi) \subset pr(K [INTERSECT] ...
Lm(Gi))
5 %
6 % SYNTAX: E=isNonblocking(K,G1,...,Gn)
7 %
8 % INPUTS: K Input automaton to bechecked
9 % Gi The set of plant models, i = 1,...,n
10 %




























supNb: finds supremal G-nonblocking sublanguage
1 function H=supNb(K,Gi,Sigma)
2
3 % SUPNB Supremal Gi-nonblocking Sublanguage
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: K=supNb(K,Gi,Sigma)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: K Specification (deterministic) automaton
8 % G Plant (deterministic) automaton
9 % Sigma System's alphabet (union model)
10 %
11 % OUTPUTS: K Trim (deterministic) automaton marking supremal
12 % Gi-nonblocking sublanguage.
13 GiM=Gi; % mark all the states of Gi, so L(GiM) == Lm(GiM) == L(Gi)
14 GiM.Xm=1:GiM.N;
15 %






















37 %% Form L4 (concatination) Sigmaˆ*
38 %





























supR: finds supremal Lm(G)-closed sublanguage
1 function E=supR(K,G)
2
3 % SUPR Supremal Relative-Closed Sublanguage
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: K=supR(K,G)
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6 %
7 % INPUTS: K Specification (deterministic) automaton
8 % G Plant (deterministic) automaton
9 %
10 % OUTPUTS: E Trim (deterministic) automaton marking supremal
11 % Lm(G)-closed sublanguage.
12 %















































supRCN: finds supremal Lm(G)-closed, controllable, G-nonblocking sublanguage
1 function K=supRCN(E,G,Eu,varargin)
2
3 % SUPRCN Supremal Relative-Closed, Controllable, Gi-nonblocking
4 % Sublanguage of E
5 %
6 % SYNTAX: K=supRCN(E,G,Eu,G1,...,Gn)
7 %
8 % INPUTS: E Specification (deterministic) automaton
9 % G Union model (deterministic) automaton
10 % Eu List of uncontrollable events (vector)
11 % Gi Plant models automaton
12 %
13 % OUTPUTS: E Trim (deterministic) automaton marking supremal






































GiveSpec: Returns overall specification of RNSCP
1 function K=GiveSpec(varargin)
2
3 % GIVESPEC Gives overall specification for robust problem.
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: K=GiveSpec(G1,...,Gn,K1,...,Kn)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: Ki Models' specifications, i = 1,...,n
8 % Gi Different models of robust problem
9 %
10 % OUTPUTS: K Overall specification of RNSCP
11 %
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expandLLSB: Expands G as a subautomaton up to N step
1 function Gexp=expandLLSB(G,S,N)
2
3 % EXPANDLLSB Expands G as a subautomaton.
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: Gexp=expandLLSB(G,S,N)
6 %
7 %
8 % INPUTS: G Input automaton to be expanded
9 % S An automaton which marks Currently Executed ...
Trace (CET)
10 % N Number of steps expansion
11 %
12 % OUTPUTS: Gexp Expansion of input automaton G
13
14 %







































expandVLSB: Expands G as a subautomaton. Stops expansion at marked control-
lable states or noncoreachable states.
1 function [Gexp,L]=expandVLSB(G,S,Euc,N)
2 % EXPANDVLSB Expands G as a subautomaton. Stops expansion at marked
3 % controllable states or noncoreachable states.
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: Gexp=expandVLSB(G,S,Euc,N)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: G Input automaton to be expanded
8 % S An automaton which marks Currently Executed ...
Trace (CET)
9 % Euc List of uncontrollable events
10 % N Maximum number of steps expansion
11 %
12 % OUTPUTS: Gexp Expansion of input automaton G




































48 % remove outgoing transitions of noncoreachable states
49 %




































detKnb: determines controllable and uncontrollable nonblocking states.
1 function [Knbc,Knbu]=detKnb(K,Euc,varargin)
2
3 % DETKNB Determins nonblocking states of specification automaton K
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: Knbc=detKnb(K,Euc,G1,...Gn)
6 % [Knbc,Knbu]=detKnb(K,Euc,G1,...Gn)
7 %
8 % INPUTS: K Specification automaton
9 % Euc List of uncontrollable events (vector)
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10 % Gi List of possible plant models
11 %
12 % OUTPUTS: Knbc automaton with all controllable nonblocking ...
states marked






































detNSB: determines NB as defined before
1 function NB=detNSB(Knb,Euc)
2
3 % DETKNB Determins NB which is required to determine length of ...
window
4 %
5 % SYNTAX: NB=detNSB(Knb,Euc)
6 %
7 % INPUTS: Knb Input automaton marking nonblocking states of SPEC
8 % Euc List of uncontrollable events (vector)
9 %



















RLL: implements RLL supervisor
1 function [CET,ONLINE,ONLINE_SYS]=RLL(E,G,Eu,N,varargin)
2
3 % RLL Implements RLL supervisor to solve a RNSCP. It returns
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4 % the set of enabled events at each step, so the user ...
can choose
5 % among the different possibilities. It cotinues until the
6 % execution is intrupted by the user. The program ...
returns an
7 % automaton which markes the executed trace.
8 %
9 % SYNTAX: CET=RLL(E,G,Eu,G1,...,Gn)
10 %
11 %
12 % INPUTS: E The overall specification of RNSCP
13 % G Union model
14 % Eu Lis of uncontrollable events
15 % N Length of lookahead window
16 % Gi Set of plant models, i = 1,..., n
17 %








25 CET=automaton(1,[],[]); %currently executed trace
26 CET.Xm=CET.N; %the last state of the string should be marked









































67 fprintf('Enabeled events:%s \n ',num2str(Enabled_Events'))
68









































1 %% Offline solution to Cassini Main Propulsion System Problem
2




































































70 Ind1=find(states_M1(:,1)==2 & states_M1(:,2)==2);
71 %










82 % Make specifications by removing illigal states.
83 %
84 K2=sys_M2_N;











95 % Make specifications by removing illigal states.
96 %
97 K3=sys_NF1;










108 % Make specifications by removing illigal states.
109 %
110 K4=sys_NF2;
























deck2gviz: constructs a .GV file of an automaton so it can be visualized byGraphViz
1
2 function deck2gviz(G, eventsLabels,statesLabels,fontSize)
3
4 % DECK2GVIZ Reads an automaton object G and save a G.GV file which
5 % constructs the automaton in DOT language to be ...
visualized
6 % in Graphviz
7 %








16 % INPUTS: G input automaton object
17 % eventsLabels struct('event',{...},'label',{...})
18 % a structure containing events and labels
19 % statesLabels struct('state',{...},'label',{...})
20 % a structure containing states and labels
21 % fontsize labels font size
22 %























45 if nargin==4 && ¬isempty(eventsLabels) && ¬isempty(statesLabels)
46 [TL_labeled,Xm_labeled]=num2label(TL,Xm,eventsLabels,statesLabels);
47 fontsize=num2str(fontSize);
48 elseif nargin==4 && ¬isempty(eventsLabels) && isempty(statesLabels)
49 [TL_labeled,Xm_labeled]=num2label(TL,Xm,eventsLabels);
50 fontsize=num2str(fontSize);
















67 fprintf(fid,'rankdir=LR;\n'); % sets direction of graph layout
68 fprintf(fid,'node [shape = none,fontcolor=white];0;\n');
149
69
70 if ¬isempty(Xm) % displayes edges of graph layout
71 for i=1:size(Xm,2)
72 fprintf(fid,...






78 % sets initial state's name
79 %






86 % marks initial state with an arrow
87 %
88 fprintf(fid,...
89 'node [shape = circle,fontcolor=black,fontsize=%s];\n',fontsize);
90 fprintf(fid,'0 -> %s [labelsize = 0];\n',IS);
91 %
92 % adds transitions to graph layout
93 %
94 if ¬isempty(TL_labeled) && ¬isempty(TL)
95 for i=1:size(TL_labeled,2)








































133 TF = TL_temp==0;











145 TF = TL_new==0;
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159 % If the event labels are specified then label the events ...
accordingly;

























183 % If the state labels are specified then label the states ...
accordingly;
184 % otherwise use the state numbers as the labels
185 %
186 for i=1:size(TL',1)
187 for j=1:size(TL',2)
188 TL_new{i,j}=TL(j,i);
189 end
190 end
191 %
192 for i=1:size(Xm',1)
193 for j=1:size(Xm',2)
194 Xm_new{i,j}=Xm(j,i);
195 end
196 end
197 %
198 TL_strc=merge(TL);
199 %
200 if ¬isempty(Xm_new)
201 Xm_strc=cell2struct(Xm_new','state');
202 else
203 Xm_strc= struct('state',[]);
204 end
205 %
206 temp=TL_strc;
207 Xm_temp=Xm_strc;
208 %
209 for i=1:size(temp,2)
210 temp(i).event={};
211 end
212 %
213 for i=1:size(eventLabels,2)
214 for j=1:size(TL_strc,2)
215 for k=1:size(TL_strc(j).event,1)
216 if eventLabels(i).event==TL_strc(j).event(k)
217 temp(j).event(k)={eventLabels(i).label};
218 end
219 end
220 end
221 end
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222 %
223 if length(varargin)==2
224 for i=1:size(statesLabels,2)
225 for j=1:size(TL_strc,1)
226 if statesLabels(i).state==TL_strc(j).source
227 temp(j).source=statesLabels(i).label;
228 end%
229 if statesLabels(i).state==TL_strc(j).sink
230 temp(j).sink=statesLabels(i).label;
231 end
232 end
233 end
234 %
235 for i=1:size(statesLabels,2)
236 for j=1:size(Xm_strc,1)
237 if statesLabels(i).state==Xm_strc(j).state
238 Xm_temp(j).state=statesLabels(i).label;
239 end
240
241 end
242 end
243 %
244 for i=1:size(statesLabels,2)
245 for j=1:size(TL_strc,2)
246 %
247 if statesLabels(i).state==TL_strc(j).source
248 temp(j).source=statesLabels(i).label;
249 end
250 %
251 if statesLabels(i).state==TL_strc(j).sink
252 temp(j).sink=statesLabels(i).label;
253 end
254 end
255 end
256 end
257 %
258 TL_labeled=temp;
259 Xm_labeled=Xm_temp;
260 %
261 end
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